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ESSAY 
TRIAL BY PREVIEW 
Bert I. Huang* 
It has been an obsession of modern civil procedure to design ways to 
reveal more before trial about what will happen during trial. Litigants 
today, as a matter of course, are made to preview the evidence they will 
use. This practice is celebrated because standard theory says it should 
induce the parties to settle; why incur the expenses of trial, if everyone 
knows what will happen? Rarely noted, however, is one complication: 
The impact of previewing the evidence is intertwined with how well the 
parties know their future audience—that is, the judge or the jury who 
will be the finder of fact at trial. Both theory and policy have focused 
narrowly on previewing the evidence, while barely noticing the comple-
mentary effect of previewing the audience. How this interplay might 
affect leading theories of settlement has yet to be articulated. This Essay 
begins to fill the gap. 
This Essay also presents preliminary empirical findings from a 
policy experiment in the federal courts, arising from recent reforms in 
civil procedure. These data suggest that the current use of evidentiary 
previews may be driving a wedge between trials by jury and trials by 
judge. Trials are “vanishing” indeed—but not all trials vanish alike. 
Preview policies may be accelerating a decline in bench trials more than 
in jury trials. New policy concerns emerge from both the data and the 
theoretical analysis, and this Essay explores how an awareness of 
asymmetric preview effects might inform current debates about proce-
dural values and policy design. 
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La Bohème, . . . even as it leaves little impression on the minds of 
the audience, will leave no great trace upon the history of our 
lyric theater.1 
      —a critic’s review after the 1896 premiere 
INTRODUCTION 
Who will testify? What objections will be raised? Which exhibits will 
come to light? In federal civil cases today, much of this information must 
be revealed before trial.2 Its unveiling on the eve of trial, moreover, is not 
the only chance for an early glimpse. The major “checkpoints” of civil 
procedure3—motions to dismiss,4 class certification,5 summary judgment6 
—have come to focus more intently on the merits of the case, forcing 
litigants to disclose more of their evidence, arguments, and strategy.7 
                                                                                                                 
1. Charles Osborne, The Complete Operas of Puccini: A Critical Guide 87 (1981) 
(quoting Carlo Bersezio writing in La Stampa).  
2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) (“Pretrial Disclosures”). The adoption of this 
disclosure rule is the policy experiment studied empirically in Part II, infra. 
3. Not to mention more specialized checkpoints—preliminary injunction hearings, 
Daubert hearings, and Markman hearings—which may overlap with merits assessments or 
preview the materials to be adjudicated at trial. 
4. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (discussing Twombly standard to 
survive motion to dismiss requiring “complaint . . . contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” meaning “plaintiff 
[must] plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). 
5. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (acknowledging 
“rigorous analysis” required during class certification “will entail some overlap with the 
merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”). 
6. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81, 386 (2007) (ordering summary judgment 
for defendant based on Justices’ own viewing of video of car chase). The shift toward 
merits-like analysis of the evidence at summary judgment can be fairly traced to the famed 
“trilogy” of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574 (1986). See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 1041–44 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Pretrial 
Rush] (discussing importance of aforementioned “1986 trilogy” of summary judgment 
cases).  
7. See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pre-Trial as Trial in Complex 
Litigation, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 647, 649 (2011) (identifying “signal judicial checkpoints” to 
be “summary judgment at the conclusion of pretrial discovery; rulings on the admissibility 
of crucial expert testimony (often, in connection with a summary judgment motion); the 
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Whether by chance or design, modern civil procedure has increasingly 
made known before trial what will likely happen at trial.  
A primary benefit of such previews of the trial materials is widely per-
ceived (without irony) to be in diverting the parties from ever getting to 
trial.8 By sharpening the parties’ forecasts of the trial outcome, the story 
goes, evidentiary previews can induce them to settle: Why spend time and 
money going through with the trial if everyone knows what will happen 
anyway? The more clearly the parties foresee the verdict, the less likely a 
verdict will be needed.9 
This logic is familiar but incomplete. After all, the facts do not just 
find themselves. A specific jury, or a specific judge in a bench trial, will 
assess the trial materials, render the verdict, and decide the outcome. For 
parties weighing whether to settle or to go to trial, there is informational 
value not only in previewing the evidence and arguments being prepared 
for trial, but also in previewing how the future audience for these mater-
ials will react to them. Each type of preview enhances the impact of the 
other: An early peek at the evidence is more useful when the parties also 
have before them the actual factfinder who will be weighing it at trial. 
Likewise, the chance to observe the factfinder’s reaction before trial is 
more useful when more of each side’s case is already on the table. 
Previewing the case and previewing the audience are complements. 
This point is not lost on practitioners and judges, of course. Some 
judges welcome the chance to signal their views about the evidence, 
                                                                                                                 
determination whether to certify litigation to proceed as a class action; and . . . dismissal 
on the pleadings before discovery has commenced”). See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 165 [hereinafter Miller, Preliminary 
Judgments] (distinguishing among these checkpoints and detailing what tends to be 
revealed at each). 
8. Even twenty years ago it was argued, “A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as 
the centerpiece of our system of justice, [it] is not only an uncommon method of resolving 
disputes, but a disfavored one. With some notable exceptions . . . pretrial settlement is 
almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.” Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, 
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 
Mich. L. Rev. 319, 320 (1991). As another commentator more recently observed that 
“many scholars, judges, and lawyers have advocated for less formal judicial intervention 
designed to replicate aspects of the adjudicative process and promote settlements that 
reflect the merits.” Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a 
Procedural Problem, 99 Geo. L.J. 65, 78 (2010). This view of trial as failure has motivated 
strong replies from those who see a risk to process values in such a systemic aversion to 
trials. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the 
Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 924, 1003 (2000) (explaining “[j]udges have . . . 
not only made plain the many facets of the role of judge (judge as settler, judge as 
negotiator, judge as manager, judge as dealmaker) but also have so deconstructed judging 
that it is at risk of being undermined as a . . . legally viable concept”). 
9. The pioneering academic papers widely credited with developing this insight are 
John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973), Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. 
Legal Stud. 399 (1973), and William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 
J.L. & Econ. 61 (1971).  
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while others are wary of the potential.10 And it is common advice for trial 
lawyers to observe the factfinder’s reactions to pretrial materials when-
ever possible.11 The scholarly literature, however, has yet to articulate 
how an appreciation of this interplay can inform the leading theories of 
the trial-or-settlement decision. And in the policymaking arena, despite 
longstanding attention to evidentiary previews as a way to promote settle-
ment,12 the complementary role of previewing the audience has tended 
to escape emphasis.13  
This Essay starts the conversation. It opens in Part I with theory and 
motivation, arguing that the effects of current (and proposed) preview 
policies are likely to differ along a fundamental divide—between trials by 
jury and trials by judge. This asymmetry means that the use of such poli-
cies can drive a wedge between these two categories, causing more 
“vanishing” of bench trials than of jury trials.14 
                                                                                                                 
10. See Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 Nev. L.J. 232, 232–33 
(2003) (describing set of practices including “signaling by the assigned trial judge at a 
Rule 16 pre-trial conference, . . . similar evaluative comments made by the trial court when 
denying a motion for summary judgment, . . . court-annexed mediation before a judge, 
and settlement conferences”); see also id. at 233 (noting “[j]udicial mediation comes in a 
variety of forms and occurs at a variety of times, from very early in the case, soon after 
filing, to the plenary trial itself”); infra Part I (discussing varieties of judicial hints and 
signals); infra Part III.C.3 (discussing judges’ role in settlement talks). 
11. For example: 
[O]ne familiar defense-side adage speaks of the value of making a motion for 
summary judgment, even when one is confident it will be denied, so as to 
compel the court to engage itself with the case and, in the course of its denial 
order, to hint at or even to signal its tentative view of the merits—all as a source 
of information about [probability of winning] p and [award amount] A for 
settlement purposes. 
Nagareda, supra note 7, at 689. Further aspects of such conventional wisdom among 
practicing litigators—not least concerning the use of mock juries, summary jury trials, and 
policies allowing jurors to suggest questions to be asked at trial—are discussed later in this 
Essay. See infra Part III.D.  
12. Justice Brennan was promoting the use of pretrial disclosures as a way of 
encouraging settlement as early as the 1950s. See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Introductory Remarks, in Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United 
States Judges (Aug. 25–30, 1958), 23 F.R.D. 319, 376, 379 (explaining disclosure “puts 
people in a frame of mind to settle”).  
13. The exception proving the rule is the D.C. Circuit’s practice of announcing early 
the identities of the panel of judges, with the express aim of inducing the parties to settle. 
This example is discussed in Part III.C.2, infra. See Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel 
Announcement, Settlement, and Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 55, 58 (noting D.C. 
Circuit’s aim of promoting settlement by announcing panel for given appeal well in 
advance—within sixty days of filing). Another exception might be summary jury trials or 
minitrials, but it appears these devices are hardly ever used. See infra notes 178–186 and 
accompanying text (discussing summary jury trials).  
14. The term “vanishing trial” was coined in the seminal article by Galanter. Marc 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459 (2004) [hereinafter Galanter, Vanishing 
Trial]. For a sampling of the vast literature that has followed, see infra note 135.  
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The story begins with a simple and intuitive contrast between what 
the parties are able to learn about the judge’s views, as opposed to the 
jury’s, during pretrial litigation.15 Before a case reaches a bench trial, 
evidentiary previews allow a judge to signal her views based on those 
materials—call it a “judicial preview”16—and these signals are especially 
telling to the parties because this judge will eventually be the final fact-
finder. 17  Even if the judge does not express her reactions to the 
evidence, the parties may be able to make good predictions based on her 
pattern of decisions, not least her pretrial rulings in the present case.  
But before a case reaches a jury trial, the factfinder remains 
unknown, as the jury has yet to be chosen. The judge’s pretrial signals 
may be of little help to the parties in forecasting what the future jurors 
will think—just as a professional critic’s review of a show may be a poor 
predictor for how the public will like it. 
How does this asymmetry factor into decisions about whether to go 
to trial? Enter the two leading theories of the trial-or-settlement choice. 
In the standard account, the sharing of evidence should cause conver-
gence in the parties’ forecasts of the outcome—possibly leading them to 
settle and avoid trial.18 Challenging this account, behavioral economists 
                                                                                                                 
15. The sharp distinction drawn here is for exposition’s sake; the more blurred 
realities are noted in Part I and are central to the policy analyses in Part III. 
16. It is a “judicial preview” in a dual sense: The judge is exposed to the future trial 
materials, and the parties are exposed to the judge’s reactions.  
17. The judge may even do so with an eye towards promoting settlement. See Miller, 
Preliminary Judgments, supra note 7, at 202 (“Judges often provide litigants with cogent 
information about the value of their cases at pretrial conferences. . . . [M]any courts play a 
forceful role in settlement conferences [that might] . . . include providing the parties with 
clear indications of the judge’s views about the case and also specific recommendations for 
settlement.” (citations omitted)); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 593, 613 (2005) (discussing development of pretrial conference as express 
opportunity for judges to encourage settlement).  
18. The vast literature elaborating on the notion that convergence tends to lead to 
settlement includes those studies which follow (and even some of those which challenge) 
the canonical “Priest-Klein” understanding of the choice to settle or to go to trial. See, e.g., 
Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-
Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. Legal 
Stud. 233, 257 (1996) (finding plaintiff win rate is closer to fifty percent in cases that 
conform more closely to assumptions underlying simple divergent expectations model); 
Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. Legal Stud. 493, 
501 (1996) (challenging Priest and Klein model’s proposition that there is fifty percent 
probability plaintiffs prevail at trial); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The 
Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle 
Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 427, 460–61 (1995) 
(supporting Priest and Klein predictions that relatively weak cases should be more likely to 
settle and that party with greater stake in litigation will have higher win rate in 
adjudication disputes, but explaining settlement process does not produce complete 
selection); Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent 
Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & Econ. 451, 474 (1998) [hereinafter 
Waldfogel, Reconciling] (presenting evidence that relationship between cases tried and 
cases where plaintiffs win at trial is consistent with divergent expectations theory, not 
2013] TRIAL BY PREVIEW 1329 
  
have run experiments showing that information sharing can backfire. 
Given the same new facts, each side might believe self-servingly that its 
own case is even stronger than before.19 Evidentiary previews could thus 
thwart settlement and lead to more trials.  
The asymmetry between bench and jury cases cuts across this debate. 
In the standard account, one might expect evidentiary previews to be 
especially informative in a bench case—thanks in part to the potential for 
a judicial preview. The result would be more convergence and hence 
fewer trials, with a greater effect on bench trials. In the competing behav-
ioral account, however, one might expect evidentiary previews to feed 
the parties’ self-serving biases. A gap between bench and jury cases might 
then emerge for two reasons: First, there may be more room for such 
bias when the future audience is yet unknown (as in a jury case).20 
Second, no signals from the absent jury are available before trial to 
debias the parties. The expected result would be wider divergence and 
hence more jury trials. The use of previews should have an asymmetric 
impact, then, under either of the two theories. To set it in today’s context 
of vanishing trials, previews may be expected to accelerate the decline of 
bench trials more than that of jury trials.21 
This asymmetric vanishing of trials, it turns out, is observable. Part II 
reports data from a policy experiment in the federal courts: In 1993, a 
new rule of civil procedure was introduced, requiring the sort of eve-of-
trial previews mentioned above.22 Most federal district courts imple-
                                                                                                                 
asymmetric information theory); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the 
Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 229, 240–48 (1995) 
[hereinafter Waldfogel, Selection] (presenting evidence for selection hypothesis in 
estimated relationships between trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial across case types 
and judges). The original Priest-Klein contribution is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984).  
19. See infra Part I.C (describing view that parties interpret additional information in 
self-serving ways and that party expectations therefore diverge rather than converge). 
20. In brief, the reason is that more bias is possible when the newly gained 
information is susceptible to a wider range of interpretations. What counts is not just the 
precision of the previewed materials themselves, but also the precision with which the 
parties can guess how the audience at trial will react to those materials. Therefore, even 
when given the same information, parties have more room to be overly optimistic about 
what it means for their prospects when they do not yet face their future audience than 
when they do. See infra Part I.C.2. 
21. In the standard account, the reason for this difference is more of a fall in bench 
trials than in jury trials. In the behavioral story, the reason is less of a rise in bench trials 
than in jury trials. 
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3); see also Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401, 403–04, 610–12 (1993) (noting adoption). The rule requires 
each party to disclose the witnesses it “expects to present” at trial as well as those witnesses 
a party decides to call because “the need arises.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). Each side 
must say which documents and exhibits it “expects to offer,” and which it “may offer if the 
need arises.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(C). Parties must also identify the excerpts of certain 
depositions that they expect to present, and disclose certain objections, such as objections 
to the admissibility of exhibits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3). Exceptions to these disclosures 
1330 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1323 
  
mented this rule within a few years.23 Yet a small handful opted out of the 
rule. These opt-out districts were forced to “catch up” as late adopters in 
2000, when uniformity was imposed by the rulemakers.24 The mandatory 
imposition of Rule 26(a)(3) in these districts is the policy shock exam-
ined here.25 To capture differential effects between bench and jury cases, 
this study focuses on an intuitive relative measure, the ratio of completed 
bench trials to completed jury trials. It also reports the separate effects 
on the rate of bench trials and on the rate of jury trials. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to document the impact of the eve-of-
trial preview rule. 
The asymmetry is apparent in the data: The districts forced to adopt 
the rule showed greater declines in bench trials relative to jury trials, a 
pattern not seen in the comparison districts. As a double check, two dis-
tinct regional groupings of districts are considered, one centered in 
California and another in New England. The asymmetric effects can be 
discerned in each geographic group, both in graphs of raw data and 
when quantified as simple estimates. It should be emphasized, however, 
that because civil trials are now so infrequent in the federal courts, the 
available sample sizes are very small. As a result, the data reported here 
                                                                                                                 
exist for material that is solely used for impeachment. See id. These disclosures, which 
occur shortly before trial, should not be confused with “initial disclosures” under Rule 
26(a)(1). 
23. The variation among districts in adoption and implementation of the rule is 
detailed in Part II.A, infra. See generally Donna Stienstra, Fed. Judicial Ctr., 
Implementation of Disclosure in United States District Courts, with Specific Attention to 
Courts’ Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (1998), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/FRCP2698.pdf/$File/FRCP2698
.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
24. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“[T]he 
1993 amendments permitted local rules directing that disclosure would not be required or 
altering its operation. . . . A striking array of local regimes in fact emerged. . . . Many 
lawyers have experienced difficulty in coping with divergent disclosure and other 
practices. . . . These amendments restore national uniformity to disclosure practice.”). 
25. The canonical reference for the social science approach of using a “catch-up” 
policy shock within a difference-in-differences study design is Jonathan Gruber, The 
Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 622 (1994) (applying triple-
differences technique to study effect on labor market of federal laws mandating 
comprehensive insurance coverage for childbirth). A difference-in-differences study is (in 
essence) a before-and-after study that also uses a comparison group; it compares how 
outcomes changed in the policy-treated population against how outcomes changed in an 
untreated population. An elegant example of its use in the legal literature is Christine Jolls 
& J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of Disability 
Discrimination (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,  
Working Paper No. 106, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=580741 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (using variations in state disability regimes before Americans 
with Disabilities Act to estimate impact of individual provisions of law). 
2013] TRIAL BY PREVIEW 1331 
  
are noisy.26 Nonetheless, these preliminary findings may serve as a spur 
for further data gathering, analysis, and theoretical reflection.27 
The normative concerns potentially at stake also provide motivation. 
As Part III explains, audience-driven preview effects can deepen a 
tradeoff between the procedural values of seeking “accuracy” and avoid-
ing “idiosyncrasy” in the resolution of cases. This tension, moreover, may 
be aggravated by the mismatch between private and social aims in litiga-
tion. Preview policies can also either exacerbate or compensate for imbal-
ances between more and less sophisticated litigants, and which effect 
dominates may depend on how judges respond to previews. 
Part III also explores more practical policy design questions. How 
can civil procedure manage the previewing of the judge—or even the 
jury? Procedural choices that affect the force of judicial previews include 
whether multiple judges are rotated through a given case, when the iden-
tity of the trial judge is announced, and what role judges are allowed to 
play in mediating settlement. And even if previewing the actual jury may 
not be possible, policy choices that may affect the predictability of a jury’s 
reactions include the use of summary jury trials, the geographic breadth 
of the jury pool, and the degree of parties’ control over forum choice. 
Less obvious, but no less important, is the role of the parties’ expec-
tations about what they will learn about their actual jury during trial; this 
anticipation might well influence the parties’ decisions before trial. If so, 
then certain trial procedures also become relevant, including the 
mechanics of voir dire, as well as recent reforms allowing jurors them-
selves to propose questions to be asked in the course of trial.28 Notably, 
existing variations in such policies and practices may be well suited for 
empirical research. The Conclusion points to these and other paths for 
further inquiry.   
 
 
                                                                                                                 
26. More on the limitations and advantages of this study’s data and design is offered 
in Part II, infra. One advantage of the present approach is worth noting here: An 
alternative explanation of the data would need to say why outcomes in the treatment 
groups departed from those in the control groups at the time of the policy change, and 
asymmetrically, as between jury and bench cases. Hence generic explanations, such as 
broad trends or across-the-board reforms, tend not to be satisfying alternatives.  
27. Notably, this study’s design is not intended to assess the effects of switching 
between a jury or judge as factfinder, or of assigning a given case to one or the other; 
rather, this study assesses the differential impact of introducing a previews policy in the 
two categories of cases. Further research directed at the former question would be 
especially complementary to the present approach.  
28. The Roger Clemens trial may be the most familiar recent use of the juror 
questions device. See Mark A. Drummond, How About a Free Shadow Jury? Inside the 
Juror’s Mind, Litig. News, Winter 2013, at 16, 16 (reporting on attorney experiences with 
juror questions in Clemens trial). 
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I. A THEORY OF PREVIEWS 
Okay. I’m just going to talk out loud for a minute, but I’m 
not—I am not previewing how I’m going to rule because I need 
to hear the evidence, but I think the clients ought to hear this.  
I am, frankly, quite puzzled as to why this case is going to 
trial. And maybe it’s the patent infringement issue, maybe that’s 
what it is. But it doesn’t look to me like it’s a trial that’s going to 
result in a significant amount of money recovered on either 
side. I could be completely wrong about that.29 
 
Imagine the course of a lawsuit in which each party is forced to pre-
view its trial strategy for the other side. As the trial date approaches, not 
only must the parties “tip their hands,” but they must also say how they 
will play them, revealing which witnesses they will call, which exhibits 
they will use, and what objections they will raise. In some cases, this dis-
closure amounts to handing over a storyboard of the narratives they will 
tell at trial.30  
Now imagine further that the judge can signal what she thinks of 
these previewed narratives before trial begins.31 She may let her reactions 
                                                                                                                 
29. Transcript of Final Pretrial Conference at 60, Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. 
Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2008) (No. CV 06-02141-PHX-DGC) (remarks 
of trial judge David G. Campbell to parties). The judge later exhorts:  
What I am going to do between now and the end of January is I’m going to 
require you all to sit down and try to settle—settle the case, with the clients in 
the room. . . . Because you now know more than you will ever know till we get to 
trial about what this case looks like. I think you’ve probably learned a lot from 
each side today about just what the evidence isn’t. 
Id. at 62. 
30. Again, these are precisely the disclosures now required in the federal system 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) and empirically studied in Part II, infra. 
To belabor what may be obvious: These eve-of-trial listings occur against a backdrop of 
completed discovery. As a result, the parties already know much of the content of the 
listed items (including witness testimony, as captured in depositions); the value of these 
lists is in revealing what content the other side plans to use at trial. But it should be 
emphasized that other “checkpoints” in litigation can also serve a similar previewing 
function. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (surveying examples of merits-like 
investigations at various stages, including summary judgment); see also, e.g., Kevin J. 
Culligan & Diana I. Valet, [Some of the] Things that Count in Patent Cases, in Patent 
Basics for the Non-Specialist 2008, at 91, 99 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & 
Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 931, 2008) (identifying Markman hearing in 
patent trials as “something akin to mini-trial[]” that “may be full-blown evidentiary 
hearing[]” and “often establishes the tone of the case, even if it is not dispositive of all of 
the issues”); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the 
Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 217, 259 (2006) 
(noting Daubert hearing “also provides litigants with a preview of the strength of their 
opponents’ cases, which may encourage settlement or support a motion to dismiss a weak 
case on summary judgment”).  
31. One practitioner’s guide explained the value of bringing the client to observe 
such judicial hints:  
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be known while running the final pretrial conference as a “rehearsal for 
trial.”32 Or, she may hint in more subtle ways, as practitioners know.33 
Based on the previews, for instance, she may urge the parties to stipulate 
to facts that she thinks are too obvious (or inconsequential) to take up 
time at trial.34 Or she may not need to hint at all. The parties’ predictions 
about how she will react to the materials may be sharpened just by know-
ing who she is; much may already be known about her inclinations, her 
reputation, or even her history with the present case.35  
The parties thus receive not only previews of the stories to be told at 
trial, but also a preview of the audience for those stories.36 These are 
                                                                                                                 
Attending the pretrial conference and seeing the court’s reaction to the various 
undisputed and disputed issues of fact and law in the case may provide the client 
with an “inside look” that is necessary to fully evaluate settlement options and to 
see firsthand how the facts, themes, and theories of the case present to an 
impartial arbiter. 
James J. Marcellino & Brian W. Robinson, Pretrial Preparation, in Massachusetts Superior 
Court Civil Practice Manual § 11.2 (Paul A. Chernoff ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
32. Comm. on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt., The Judicial Conference of the U.S., 
Civil Litigation Management Manual 99–100 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Civil Litigation 
Management Manual], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivLit2D. 
pdf/$file/CivLit2D.pdf (noting some judges “treat [the final pretrial conference] as little 
more than a scheduling event” but others “use it as a thorough rehearsal for the trial”). By 
contrast, this same handbook for judges warns against such a rehearsal-like preview at the 
summary judgment stage. Id. at 57 (“Beware of overbroad motions for summary judgment 
that are designed to make the opponent rehearse the case before trial.”). 
33. See Thomas A. Mauet, Bench Trials, Litigation, Summer 2002, at 13, 15. This 
practice guide for litigating bench trials advises lawyers to pay close attention to the 
judge’s pretrial signals:  
[T]he judge’s notion of what the judge wants to hear and see trumps the 
lawyers’ notions of what the judge should hear and see. . . . Some judges will tell 
you what they see as the key factual and legal issues and what they want to hear 
and see to resolve those disputes. 
Id. at 14–15. 
34. Or more subtly, if she has indicated how she might rule on the objections, the 
parties might read substantive clues into her evidentiary rulings. For a colorful example, 
consider one judge’s telling reaction during a final pretrial conference, in a colloquy 
about excluding a proposed expert: “[H]ow does his proposed conclusion require any 
expertise? In other words, isn’t it common sense that body armor, which must be replaced 
biannually, isn’t economically feasible?” Transcript of Final Pretrial Conference at 7, First 
Choice Armor & Equip., Inc. v. Toyobo Am., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(No. 09-cv-11380).  
35. See, e.g., Mauet, supra note 33, at 14 (“Ask other members of your firm and 
lawyer friends about their experiences with the judge in your kind of case. Watch the 
judge during a bench trial or during a contested motion hearing for clues on how the 
judge acts, thinks, and makes decisions.”). Such data about the ultimate factfinder would 
not be possible to gather in a jury trial. 
36. Commentators and practitioners alike have noted this possibility. See, e.g., Steven 
Wolowitz, Techniques for Expediting and Streamlining Litigation, in Commercial 
Litigation in New York State Courts § 60:42 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2010) (noting in 
bench trials judges may give indications of their views of case during pretrial); Molot, 
supra note 8, at 78 (“Rather than intervening through formal motion practice, a judge 
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complements: The more that is revealed in the parties’ evidentiary pre-
views, the more telling the judge’s reactions will be. Likewise, the pres-
ence of the judge and the parties’ knowledge about her predispositions 
make previewing the trial materials more informative. Enhanced 
learning of this complementary sort can boost each party’s ability to 
forecast the outcome of a trial.37 
But what if the factfinding role at trial falls to a jury, rather than a 
judge? Then the story is rather different. As the jury will not be chosen 
until trial begins, no hints from the future audience can be observed 
before the trial. There may be a preview of the judge, but what is really 
needed (and is lacking) is a preview of the jury.38 Future jurors may see 
the evidence very differently than the judge, and one potential jury may 
see things very differently than another.39 Before trial, much still rests on 
how jury selection will play out. Little more than rough demographics 
may be known, and each side may remain optimistic about getting “its” 
jury.40 Because previewing the audience is not possible in a jury case, the 
kind of enhanced learning that can be gained in a bench case is lost.41  
The bench-versus-jury contrast as presented thus far is rather 
stylized, of course. A more realistic rendering would describe these differ-
ences as matters of degree. A jury pool might be extremely predictable in 
some jurisdictions or for certain kinds of cases.42 And some judges and 
their views might remain something of a mystery (perhaps intentionally) 
before trial. Alternatively, signals from a judge before trial might be 
informative even in a jury case; judges can influence jurors’ thinking, 
such as by limiting what evidence they see, and judges can sometimes 
override jury verdicts or remit damage awards. For ease of exposition, 
                                                                                                                 
may promote settlements in line with the merits—and indeed pressure the parties to 
settle—simply by providing his views of the merits and his predictions for trial at a judicial 
settlement conference.”). 
37. It is possible that these two types of previews might also feed back into each other 
in other ways; for instance, judicial previews may lead the parties to adjust their intended 
narratives. 
38. Litigators have long made use of mock juries as an approximation. See infra 
notes 173–176 (explaining value of mock juries). 
39. See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 Tex. L. Rev. 
571, 583–89 (2012) (surveying studies documenting wide variation in injury valuation 
among juries). 
40. Although the parties will play a role in choosing the jurors, uncertainty remains 
because the two sides may be pulling in opposite directions. For a fuller analysis of the 
parties’ sense of uncertainty about their future jury, see infra Part III.D.2.  
41. These days, civil litigators know even less about juries, given how few civil jury 
trials any of them ever do in their career. I thank Judge Gerard Lynch for this insight. 
42. Most familiar to the popular imagination may be the fabled “Bronx jury.” See, 
e.g., Arthur S. Hayes, Inner-City Jurors Tend to Rebuff Prosecutors and to Back Plaintiffs, 
Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1992, at A1 (reporting “Bronx juries, the data show, find the defendant 
liable in a lopsided 72% of civil cases, compared with a national average of 57%”); see also 
infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing venues with folkloric status in assigning 
punitive damages).  
2013] TRIAL BY PREVIEW 1335 
  
this Essay will often speak of the bench-versus-jury distinction as binary, 
but the logic of the analysis applies also to the more realistic scenario of 
differences in degree.43  In general, the informational gains from a 
“judicial preview” should be greater in bench cases than in jury cases—
the simplest reason being that, in a bench case, the judge who is present 
at the time of the previews will also be the factfinder at the actual trial. 
A. Competing Effects 
The contrast drawn between bench and jury cases thus far is simple 
and intuitive. More complicated—and as yet unarticulated in the litera-
ture—is how the contrast might translate into differential impacts on 
parties’ choices about whether to settle or go to trial. 
Two competing theories of the trial-or-settlement decision must be 
considered. The following analysis cuts across the debate, introducing 
the bench-versus-jury contrast to both the standard theory and the lead-
ing countertheory. The standard theory (call it the “convergence story”) 
is the familiar economic model, in which an increase in information 
sharing leads to convergence in the parties’ forecasts about the out-
come—and hence to a greater chance of settlement. The countertheory 
(call it the “divergence story”) is a critique proposed by behavioral econ-
omists, based on psychological experiments showing how increasing the 
available information can cause divergence in beliefs—and hence a greater 
chance of trial. This Part takes each in turn. 
B. The Convergence Story 
No doubt parties who would eventually settle at trial might do so 
earlier if they were made to “show their cards” sooner. But can previews 
prompt not only earlier settlement, but also more settlement? Why would 
other cases—ones that would not settle during trial, even after strategies 
and audience reactions are known—nonetheless settle before trial, based 
on similar information?  
In the standard economic account, the answer is that before trial 
costs have started to be spent, there is more to be saved by settling. The 
following subsection elaborates on this intuition, using a simple illus-
tration in which parties can learn from new information gained before 
and during trial.44 For the sake of focus, this exposition abstracts away 
                                                                                                                 
43. Indeed, policy tools for regulating these degrees, and for further blurring the 
boundary, are suggested in Part III, infra. 
44. This illustration builds on the standard model of settlement by adding both the 
possibility of learning during trial itself and the interplay between the previewed materials 
and the presence of the audience. Other models of pretrial learning abound in the 
literature, but do not include these features. The possibility of learning trial strategy at 
earlier points in litigation is discussed in Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, 
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 110–11 (1990). A canonical 
model for learning during litigation is presented, in the context of discovery, by Robert D. 
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from other factors that are undeniably important in the choice to settle 
or to go to trial, among them the role of emotions and ego, risk aversion, 
and reputational concerns.45 
1. More Information, Fewer Trials. — Imagine parties to a lawsuit on 
the eve of trial (call them the Plaintiff and the Defendant), looking 
ahead and deciding whether to settle. For settlement to occur, the Plain-
tiff must be willing to accept what the Defendant is willing to offer. The 
minimum the Plaintiff is willing to accept to end the litigation right away 
is its expected winnings, minus the trial costs it would have to spend to 
get to that judgment. Any less and it would do better by going to trial.46 
Likewise, the Defendant is willing to offer no more than its expected pay-
out, plus any further costs it would save by avoiding trial.47 Any more and 
it would do better by going to trial.48  
Settlement occurs at amounts between the Plaintiff’s minimum ask 
and the Defendant’s maximum bid. Such a “zone of settlement” is more 
likely to exist when the parties’ forecasts are similar.49 The logic is 
familiar: Why should each side pay to go through with trial when every-
                                                                                                                 
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Discovery, 23 J. Legal Stud. 435 
(1994); see also Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. Legal 
Stud. 481 (1994) (taking Cooter-Rubinfeld model as “point of departure”); Andrew Teruo 
Hayashi, The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure, in Essays in Behavioral Law and Economics 
48, 60–69 (Fall 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (adapting Cooter-Rubinfeld model).  
45. Although risk aversion is bracketed in this Essay’s analysis, especially intriguing 
questions might be raised by its consideration: Would self-serving bias, in the behavioral 
economists’ story, tend to reduce perceived uncertainty and hence the impact of risk 
aversion? Does risk aversion relate in different ways to the two distinct conceptions of “jury 
uncertainty” analyzed in Part III.D?  
46. We can denote this threshold as Pp J - c, where Pp is the Plaintiff’s subjective 
estimate of the probability of a favorable verdict; J is the amount of the judgment that 
would be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff; and c is the cost of trial (which for 
convenience is assumed here to be the same for both sides). For ease, the exposition 
throughout will speak in terms of uncertainty about the probability of the Plaintiff 
winning, and the parties will be assumed to share the same estimate of the judgment 
amount. But a very similar analysis would apply if the parties differed as to the amount 
rather than the probability, as what matters for settlement is the divergence in the 
expected value of the case. 
47. The Defendant’s maximum offer is thus Pd J + c. 
48. This logic has entered the conventional wisdom. As one Supreme Court opinion 
observed, “Most defendants are unlikely to settle unless the cost of the predicted 
judgment, discounted by its probability, plus the transaction costs of further litigation, are 
greater than the cost of the settlement package.” Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986). 
This is also the standard assumption in the theory literature. See, e.g., Kessler et al., supra 
note 18; Priest & Klein, supra note 18; Shavell, supra note 18; Waldfogel, Reconciling, 
supra note 18; Waldfogel, Selection, supra note 18. 
49. The zone exists if Pp J - c < Pd
 J + c. Notice that if the parties hold the same beliefs 
about what will happen (Pp = Pd), they will settle. Doing so will save them a total of 2c in 
trial costs (a surplus they will split through bargaining). Even if their beliefs are different, 
but are close enough, then the promise of the shared surplus will overcome the gap in 
expectations: They settle if Pp - Pd < 2c/J. Otherwise they do not. 
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one knows what will happen?50 If the parties’ forecasts are far enough 
apart, they will not settle but go to trial.51 What can narrow the gap, how-
ever, is sharing information about the case. In the standard account, if 
both parties update their forecasts based on the same new information, 
their forecasts will converge—potentially inducing settlement. 
To this familiar story we can introduce the possibility of previews. 
Previews can affect outcomes by altering the timing of the learning. Con-
sider the abstract timeline shown in the diagram below. Imagine that 
during trial (at time t1), the parties may learn something about the 
strength of the case. For instance, they may detect good or bad reactions 
from the jury to each side’s presentations. Based on this signal, they may 
update their forecasts of the outcome—and if there is enough conver-
gence, they may settle.52  
Now imagine that the parties can learn the same information on the 
eve of trial, at t0. This earlier learning is possible thanks to a preview at t0.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this stylized illustration, there can be cases that would not have 
settled during trial, and yet would settle on the eve of trial.53 The reason 
                                                                                                                 
50. It is worth a reminder that the key criterion is that the parties’ beliefs be close to 
each other—not that they be close to the true P. The parties could be way off the mark in 
their predictions, but they will settle as long as their forecasts are similar enough. And 
even if one of them is precisely correct, there is no settlement unless the other side’s 
forecast is close enough. 
51. Despite anticipating the costs of continuing on to trial, each side expects to do 
better by going through with it. To illustrate using a numerical scenario (call this Scenario 
A): Suppose that the Plaintiff expects to win with a probability of 3/4, but the Defendant 
thinks the probability is only 1/4. If trial costs c = 30, and the judgment J = 200, then the 
Plaintiff will accept nothing under 3/4 (200) - 30 = 120. But the Defendant will offer no 
more than 1/4 (200) + 30 = 80. Here, Pp J - c > Pd J + c. There is no room for a deal. 
52. The Plaintiff updates from Pp  to Pp* and the Defendant from Pd to Pd*. This 
learning occurs at time t1, after the parties have each spent c1 out of the total trial costs c = 
c1 + c2. At this point, they can decide whether to settle. In theory they will settle at this point 
if Pp*J - c2 < Pd*J + c2. If the parties do not settle, they complete the trial, spend the 
remaining c2, and reach the verdict at time t2. 
53. Consider again Scenario A, supra note 51: If on the eve of trial the parties receive 
information suggesting that P = 1/2, and they weigh this equally with their prior 
information, the gap in their forecasts closes from Pp = 3/4 versus Pd = 1/4, to Pp = 5/8 
versus Pd = 3/8. The gap thus halves, from 1/2 to 1/4; and likewise with the gap in 
  Earlier                                Later  
  Learning                            Learning 
 (previews)                           (at trial) 
Eve of Trial        Trial Begins           Trial Continues        Verdict 
  (cost = c1)                  (cost = c2) 
|                                          |                                             | 
t0                                         t1                                           t2          
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is the familiar intuition that there is more to be saved by settling (or 
“settlement surplus”) before any trial costs have been spent. Thus parties 
who will have no zone of agreement left after trial begins might yet have 
some room to settle on the eve of trial.54 The extra savings from avoiding 
the first part of trial, c1 for each side, create this possibility.55 
2. Enhanced Learning in Bench Cases. — Learning the same infor-
mation at an earlier point can thus make all the difference for settle-
ment. If the parties believe that what they are learning on the eve of trial 
is closely similar to what they will come to learn at trial, then there may 
be little or no reason to pay more to get to t1, as little or nothing new will 
be learned at that point. The more predictive value the early information 
has, the greater the impact on settlement. 
But bench cases and jury cases differ in this regard, as we have 
already seen. First, the extra informational gains from a “judicial 
preview” are more likely in bench cases than in jury cases. Moreover, 
aside from having the “right” audience present at the time of the pre-
views, enhanced learning also depends on having the “right” materials—
the sort that will matter to the eventual audience—revealed in the pre-
views. On this dimension, too, bench cases may have the advantage. 
Lawyerly conventional wisdom suggests that juries respond more to 
emotional appeal and rhetoric than judges do.56  The truth of this 
generalization matters less than whether many lawyers believe it.57 It 
appears they do, and they choose jury trials when their storytelling cen-
                                                                                                                 
expected judgment, from 100 to 50. Just as if they learned this information during trial, 
the Plaintiff expects to win 5/8 (200) = 125 at trial and the Defendant expects to pay 3/8 
(200) = 75. If they learned this information during trial, and if 2(c2) < 50, they would not 
settle at that point. By contrast, on the eve of trial, settlement is more attractive than it 
would be at trial. Facing combined costs of 2(c1 + c2) = 60, and with a gap in estimates of 50, 
the parties do perceive a zone of agreement. Given the extra savings from avoiding the 
first part of trial, the Plaintiff is willing to accept less than before, 125 - 30 = 95, and the 
Defendant is willing to offer more, 75 + 30 = 105. They will settle for an amount between 
95 and 105.  
54. The reverse is not true; any case that will not settle on the eve of trial at t0 (when 
the surplus is greater) also will not settle during trial at t1 (when the surplus is less).  
55. There is no settlement zone after trial starts if Pp* J - c2 > Pd* J + c2, but there can be 
a settlement zone before the initial trial costs are spent, if Pp* J - (c1 + c2) < Pd* J + (c1 + c2). 
56. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending 
Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1149 (1992) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, 
Trial by Jury or Judge] (citing longstanding perceptions of juries as more desirable for 
cases “rest[ing] on emotional or sympathy issues” and less able to handle complicated 
legal issues); see also Jerry M. Custis, Litigation Management Handbook § 8.32 
(2011)(noting “juries [are] likely to favor . . . emotional appeals to right versus wrong 
rather than strict application of the law”). 
57. Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading 
Judges 31 (2008) (describing “nature of what [lawyers] typically think of as ‘jury 
argument’ [as] a blatant appeal to sympathy or other emotions, as opposed to a logical 
application of the law to the facts”). 
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ters on the demeanor of witnesses or the sympathetic look of a plaintiff.58 
But this is not the sort of information that tends to be revealed by pre-
views “on paper.” By contrast, what judges are thought to look to in a 
bench trial may be a closer match to what previews reveal. A judge may 
be more likely to be focused on documentary evidence59 or the content 
of testimony (and not the way it is given);60 bench cases may also involve 
more complex evidence, as the parties choosing a bench trial may be 
ones who think judges are more competent than juries in handling such 
materials.61 
With less informational value gained from previews in jury cases than 
in bench cases, there will likely be less convergence in the parties’ 
forecasts—and, as a result, fewer settlements induced. In the standard 
convergence story, all else equal, the introduction of previews should 
have a greater effect of promoting settlements in bench cases than in jury 
cases. 
C. The Divergence Story 
Today, the leading countertheory to the convergence story is one 
developed by behavioral economists and grounded in findings from 
psychological experiments. This view is that individuals tend to interpret 
information in “self-serving” ways. As a result, there is no guarantee that 
gaining new information means greater accuracy (or convergence) in the 
parties’ predictions. To the contrary, presented with new facts, each side 
may come to see its own case as even stronger than before.62 The sharing 
                                                                                                                 
58. See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge, supra note 56, at 
1126, 1149–51 (surmising litigants choose whether to request jury trial based on 
stereotypical view of juries as responding to such factors); Amy Tindell, Toward a More 
Reliable Fact-Finder in Patent Litigation, 13 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 309, 323–24 (2009) 
(finding one reason parties choose jury trials for patent cases is belief juries will base 
decisions on sympathy for one party). 
59. See Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, First-of-Its-Kind CLE Program on 
Using Affidavits in Lieu of Direct Testimony at Trial on September 20 (Aug. 11, 2011), 
available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/file/news/cle_program_info (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (noting “use of affidavits in lieu of direct testimony” has become 
“prevalent in federal courts” for bench trials). 
60. Indeed, during trial a judge may also be more likely to accept testimony on paper 
or in deposition form, rather than take live testimony in court, if she herself is the 
factfinder. 
61. See Custis, supra note 56, § 8.32 (stating conventional wisdom that juries are 
better for simple cases and judges for more complex cases); James J. Gobert & Walter E. 
Jordan, Jury Selection: The Law, Art, and Science of Selecting a Jury § 1.23 (2d ed. 1990) 
(“[A] party might decide to waive a jury . . . where the attorney plans to present evidence   
. . . which may be difficult to comprehend. A judge is less likely than a jury to be confused 
by complex evidence.”). But see Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent 
Litigation, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 791, 824 (2001) (noting party may prefer jury 
in complex case if only hope in case is to confuse jury and even out odds of winning). 
62. Here is an especially clear articulation of this bias: “Whenever there is room for 
disagreement about a matter to be decided by two or more parties—and of course there 
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of more information before trial can thus cause the parties’ expectations 
to diverge, rather than converge. 
1. More Information, More Trials? — This upshot may seem strange. 
Yet the theory finds support in experiments based on litigation and bar-
gaining scenarios, and field research suggests that actual litigators are 
hardly immune from overconfident predictions. 63  The foundational 
studies are a pair of experiments by Linda Babcock, Colin Camerer, 
Samuel Issacharoff, and George Loewenstein, showing that students role-
playing plaintiffs and defendants tended to interpret case materials as 
favoring their own side; when given more such materials, their expec-
tations diverged, and they settled less often.64 This divergence did not 
occur, however, with experimental subjects who were not told their role 
(as plaintiff or defendant) until after reading the case materials.65 
2. Enhanced Bias in Jury Cases. — A key variable in this divergence 
story must be noted. As demonstrated in a recent experiment, self-
serving bias has greater effect when the newly gained information allows 
                                                                                                                 
often is in litigation as well as elsewhere—individuals will tend to interpret information in 
a direction that serves their own interests.” Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, 
in Behavioral Economics and Its Applications 115, 123 (Peter Diamond & Hannu 
Vartiainen eds., 2007). 
63. See generally Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ 
Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 133 (2010) (showing 
overconfidence about own litigation outcomes in sample of over 400 litigators from across 
United States). For an early demonstration of self-serving bias in interpreting legal policy 
information (about the death penalty), see Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, 
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on 
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098 (1979). Other 
recent experimental work on self-serving bias, based on legal scenarios, includes Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal Rules on 
Bargaining Behavior: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 37 J. Legal Stud. 315 (2008). Other 
biases affecting settlement have also received careful attention. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin 
& Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental 
Approach, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 107 (1994) (hypothesizing psychological effects impact how 
litigants perceive, understand, and respond to settlement offers). 
64. See generally George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda 
Babcock, Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. Legal Stud. 
135 (1993). 
65. See generally Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin 
Camerer, Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 1337 (1995). 
Remarkably, informing parties about self-serving bias “had no impact either on the 
magnitude of the bias or on settlement”; rather, each side “expected their bargaining 
counterpart to exhibit the bias but seemed to think that they themselves were immune.” 
Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Convergence: 
Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 913, 921 (1997); see also Linda Babcock 
& George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 
11 J. Econ. Persp. 109, 115 (1997) (“When they learned about the bias, subjects apparently 
assumed that the other person would succumb to it, but did not think it applied to 
themselves.”). 
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for a wider range of interpretations.66 And in the present analysis, there 
may be a wider range of possibilities imaginable for how an unknown 
future jury (as compared to the known judge in a bench case) will inter-
pret the trial materials being previewed.67 One factor may be over-
optimism about “getting the jury you want,” one that will interpret things 
your way. An attorney may be overconfident about influencing the jury 
selection process, for instance, which has yet to occur.68 (In this context, 
one might also imagine how the marketing of jury consultants might 
worsen such excess optimism.) The unknowability of the future audience 
may thus be a complement that sustains or even enhances each side’s 
bias in interpreting newly disclosed information.69 
By contrast, it may be more predictable in a bench case what the pre-
viewed materials mean for the outcome of the case.70 This is especially 
true if a signal about the merits is forthcoming from the judge: Nothing 
quite cures overoptimism like a judge remarking, on the eve of trial, that 
                                                                                                                 
66 . The key to whether information exchange creates convergence or 
divergence of expectations, we show, is whether the interpretation of the 
information that is exchanged is straightforward or ambiguous. When the 
implications of the information are obvious and are not amenable to alternative 
interpretations, then the sharing of information will tend to produce 
convergence of expectations and facilitate settlement. However, when there is 
even a moderate degree of ambiguity about how information should be 
interpreted, each party will tend to interpret the information in a self-serving 
fashion, and a sharing of information will often result in a divergence of 
expectations. 
George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange 
and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. Legal Stud. 37, 38 (2004). 
67. In a jury case, uncertainty about the future audience produces a range of possible 
interpretations corresponding to what differing juries might find. For simplicity, suppose 
that there are two such possible interpretations: a “high” probability of a Plaintiff win, (PJ 
+ x), and a “low” probability, (PJ - x), where x is positive. We can represent the effect of 
self-serving bias by assuming that the Plaintiff will perceive the “high” probability as the 
meaning of the preview and the Defendant will perceive the “low” probability. Each party 
updates its expectations based on a different interpretation (the one more favorable to 
itself). Because these interpretations are separated by this expectations gap, the parties’ 
expectations will converge less in the jury case than if they were both updating based on a 
single shared interpretation, as is assumed in the bench case. If the gap is large enough, 
the parties’ expectations will become more divergent; this occurs if (PJ + x) - (PJ - x) > Pp - 
Pd. This characterization of bias follows that of Oren Bar-Gill, The Evolution and 
Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 490 (2005).  
68. On overconfidence among attorneys with regard to trial outcomes, see supra note 
63 and accompanying text.  
69. Note that unknowability does not imply uncertainty: Each side could have a self-
assured yet also self-servingly biased belief about what the future jury will think of the case. 
(Relatedly, although risk aversion is bracketed in the present analysis, it is worth noting 
that risk aversion relates to a given party’s uncertainty, and not necessarily to a divergence 
between the two parties’ beliefs.)  
70. We can represent this clear meaning, in a bench case, as a single new estimate of 
the probability of a verdict favoring the Plaintiff, Pb. Note that the jury and the judge have 
very different views, so that the jury’s range is not centered on Pb.  
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in her view the case is a loser.71 The greater influence of such judicial 
previews when the judge will be the factfinder (rather than when a jury 
will be) plays out in the behavioral story as a stronger suppression of pre-
view-induced divergence. 
One further question remains. Why would previews cause less settle-
ment (and thus more trial), rather than merely delayed settlement? If the 
identity and the reactions of the jury become clear during the course of 
trial, wouldn’t the case come to settle eventually? The answer lies again in 
the loss of settlement surplus as the case progresses. Consider the cases 
that, absent previews, would have settled before trial (at t0), but not dur-
ing trial (at t1).72 With previews, some of these cases may no longer settle 
at t0, due to the divergence effect.73 By the time the jury’s reactions 
become known at trial, however, it will have become too late for settling 
to be worthwhile. Thus by revealing information at an earlier point, 
when its meaning is more subject to biased interpretations, previews can 
ruin the last best chance for settling. 
D. Predictions of the Combined Theories 
This Part has noted how each of the two competing theories, in sepa-
rate ways, predicts an asymmetry between bench cases and jury cases in 
terms of the impact of previews on settlement. In the convergence story, 
it is because enhanced learning is more likely in the bench cases. In the 
divergence story, it is because enhanced bias is more likely in the jury 
cases. The following table summarizes these predictions about the effect 
of previews on the decision about whether to go to trial.74 
  
                                                                                                                 
71. Consider again the judge’s remarks in the epigraph, supra text accompanying 
note 29, and, more generally, the discussion above concerning judicial hints and signals, 
supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. Of course, such judicial commentary can 
occasionally be found in opinions on “checkpoint” motions, such as motions for summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Picard v. Katz, No. 11 Civ. 3605 (JSR), 2012 WL 691551, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2012) (offering “brief comments . . . to the parties” including 
observations “the Court remains skeptical that the Trustee can ultimately rebut the 
defendants’ showing of good faith, let alone impute bad faith to all the defendants,” and 
“too much of what the parties characterized as bombshells proved to be nothing but 
bombast”). 
72. This is possible when Pp J - (c1 + c2) < Pd J + (c1 + c2), but Pp
*J - c2 > Pd*J + c2. 
73. In this characterization of bias, this occurs if (PJ + x) J - (c1 + c2) > (PJ - x) J + (c1 + c2).  
74. Again, it is worth noting that the binary between bench cases and jury cases is 
stylized for exposition’s sake. Notably, the table reflects that it is of course possible for 
previews to generate some self-serving bias (and divergence) in a bench case, or some 
learning (and convergence) in a jury case.  
2013] TRIAL BY PREVIEW 1343 
  
 
Convergence story 
(Standard theory) 
Divergence story 
(Behavioral theory) 
Bench cases 
 
Enhanced learning 
More convergence 
Fewer trials 
 
Some bias 
Jury cases Some learning 
 
Enhanced bias 
More divergence 
More trials 
 
 
Assessing such predictions using real-world data is necessarily a 
daunting task, given the complexities of litigants’ motivations and the 
influence of other factors in litigation. It is especially so when competing 
theories make contrary predictions; if both theories have some truth, 
then their combined effect may be a wash. Yet the search for empirical 
clues is eased by the following observation: As the table shows, these two 
theories both predict a relative fall (that is, more of a fall or less of a rise) 
in bench trials as compared to jury trials. That is, both predict a similar 
asymmetry in the impact of previews; this asymmetry can thus serve as a 
useful diagnostic, whether one or the other theory (or both) is at work. 
Making use of this diagnostic, the next Part reports data from a recent 
policy experiment in the federal courts suggesting that current preview 
policies do influence whether cases settle or go to trial. 
II. AN EXPERIMENT IN THE COURTS 
The federal courts were in disarray during the 1990s over civil pro-
cedure reforms meant to magnify the “previewing” of case materials. 
Controversy about a new disclosure regime embodied in the 1993 Rules 
amendments had led some district courts to opt out entirely from the 
governing provisions.75 Many others opted fully into the regime, putting 
all the new disclosure rules into effect.76 Still other districts fell in 
between, crafting their own variations.77  
                                                                                                                 
75. See Stienstra, supra note 23, at 4–6.  
76. See id. at 6.  
77. See id. at 4.  
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Remarkably, such district-by-district customization was actually 
allowed by the 1993 amendments themselves.78 One reason was to pre-
serve the districts’ leeway in experimenting with case management 
devices. 79  But certainly the rulemakers knew that in some districts 
resistance to the imposition of these provisions would be fierce. Much of 
the commentary was highly critical.80 There was even a rare dissent in the 
Supreme Court in promulgating these rules.81  
By 2000, the rulemakers had decided that enough disarray was 
enough. A new round of amendments now demanded uniform adher-
ence to the disclosure rules across all federal districts. 82 They eliminated 
the option to customize: no more opting out, no more local rules devi-
ating from the federal rules, no more contrary standing orders by indi-
vidual judges. Districts which had opted out (or devised their own policy 
variations) after the 1993 amendments now had to catch up under the 
2000 amendments. 
A. The Preview Rule: A Natural Experiment 
Among the disclosures newly required are eve-of-trial previews of the 
sort imagined in the theoretical analysis above. Rule 26(a)(3) requires 
parties to disclose to all other parties and to the court, generally one 
month before trial, a list of the witnesses, depositions, and exhibits that 
                                                                                                                 
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (1993) (amended 2000) (“Except to the extent otherwise 
stipulated or directed by order or local rule . . . .”). The commentary on this opt-out 
provision is vast. For contemporary reactions, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry 
Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 757, 757 (1995) 
(characterizing contemporary proliferation of “local rules” as putting “central 
accomplishment of uniform federal rules . . . in serious jeopardy”); Samuel Issacharoff & 
George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 
753, 781 n.72 (1995) (criticizing “balkanization of procedure” enabled by opt-out 
provision); Lauren Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search of a 
Theory for Optional Rules, 14 Rev. Litig. 49, 51 (1994) (finding “startling the explicit 
rejection of the uniformity principle in the text of a civil rule regulating lawyers’ work”).  
79. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“The 
inclusion of the ‘opt out’ provision reflected the strong opposition to initial disclosure felt 
in some districts, and permitted experimentation with differing disclosure rules. . . . It was 
hoped that developing experience under a variety of disclosure systems would support 
eventual refinement of a uniform national disclosure practice.”). 
80. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of 
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1393, 1444 (1994) (explaining after reforms “[n]o federal litigator can be confident 
about what the discovery rules require or permit in any particular federal court”); Charles 
Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 Rev. Litig. 1, 11 (1994) 
(noting reforms “were far too academic and gave too little regard to privileges that the 
practicing bar and many citizens thought important”); see also supra note 78 (describing 
other contemporary reactions).  
81. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., joined by Souter & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
82. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“These 
amendments restore national uniformity to disclosure practice.”). 
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they intend to present at trial.83 It also requires them to disclose certain 
objections that they may raise.84 These requirements are enforced by the 
threat of waiver.85 
The staggered adoption of this rule among the federal districts pre-
sents a rare chance to assess the impact of such previews. The unusual 
phasing-in creates a natural experiment: What happened in the late-
adopting districts can be compared to what happened in the early-
adopting districts. Specifically, the late-adopting districts were forced into 
a policy change in 2000 (against their express choice to opt out). But the 
early-adopting districts faced no such change in 2000, having already 
begun to comply several years earlier. In the standard terminology of 
such a difference-in-differences study design, the late adopters can be 
viewed as the policy-treated (or “treatment”) group, and the early 
adopters as the untreated “comparison” group. 
1. The Storyboard Revealed. — Several features of this preview rule are 
worth special emphasis, as they add to the previews’ credibility and also 
make this policy change especially advantageous for study. First, what is 
revealed by these disclosures differs in nature from what is revealed dur-
ing discovery. Under this rule, each party must preview for the court and 
for the other side the evidence it expects to use at trial—to identify 
witnesses as well as documents, exhibits, transcripts, media, and specific 
parts of depositions.86 Moreover, each party is to label separately which of 
this evidence it is likely to present at trial, as distinguished from what 
evidence it plans to hold in reserve, to bring in as needed.87 (Litigators 
sometimes refer to these as their “will call” and “may call” lists, 
                                                                                                                 
83. This is not to be confused with “mandatory initial disclosures” under 26(a)(1), 
which occur not on the eve of trial but rather at the very beginning of a lawsuit. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(a)(1). That rule is intended to guide the discovery process yet to occur, not to 
preview what each side will present (or object to) at trial. 
84. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).  
85. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. 
86. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A)(i)–(iii):  
(A) In General. In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and (2), 
a party must provide to the other parties and promptly file the following 
information about the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for 
impeachment: 
(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone 
number of each witness—separately identifying those the party expects to 
present and those it may call if the need arises;  
(ii) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony the party expects to 
present by deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the 
pertinent parts of the deposition; and  
(iii) an identification of each document or other exhibit, including 
summaries of other evidence—separately identifying those items the party 
expects to offer and those it may offer if the need arises.  
87. See id.  
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respectively.88) Furthermore, based on the other side’s disclosures, each 
side is then required to preview certain objections it might raise at trial to 
(what it now knows to be) the evidence the other side expects to 
present.89  
Thus the rule requires parties to reveal a kind of higher-order infor-
mation: not the raw evidence in the case, but rather which pieces of it 
will likely be used at trial, and how. The value of such revelations comes 
not from rehashing what discovery has uncovered, but rather from 
narrowing it down. The parties must identify their potential use of each 
witness and piece of evidence—whether it is part of their main case, or 
something they are saving as a possible response to what the other side 
will do. 
What these previews deliver is akin to a storyboard of the narrative 
each side will be offering at trial: Of the masses of evidence collected and 
shared, which pieces will be strung together to make the case? To hear 
litigators explain it, “Seeing the other side’s list helps to crystallize what 
the other side’s presentation will focus on.”90 As the commentary has 
noticed, requiring disclosures of this sort may seem unusual within the 
tradition of an adversarial system, as it closely toes (if not oversteps) the 
familiar bounds of “mental impressions” or litigation tactics that norm-
ally would be protected from discovery and permissibly withheld from 
the other side.91 
2. Judicial Engagement. — The audience for these previews includes 
not only the parties, but also the judge. This increases the previews’ 
impact and sets them apart from discovery and other earlier disclosures. 
Discovery does not involve the judge unless and until something goes 
wrong, and as a general matter, other similar disclosures may not be filed 
                                                                                                                 
88. See, e.g., 20 Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 86 (2d ed. 2011). 
89. See Fed R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B):  
Time for Pretrial Disclosures; Objections. Unless the court orders otherwise, these 
disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days after they 
are made, unless the court sets a different time, a party may serve and promptly 
file a list of the following objections: any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) 
of a deposition designated by another party under Rule 26(a)(3)(A)(ii); and any 
objection, together with the grounds for it, that may be made to the admissibility 
of materials identified under Rule 26(a)(3)(A)(iii). An objection not so made—
except for one under Federal Rule of Evidence 402 or 403—is waived unless 
excused by the court for good cause. 
90. James W. Quinn and David J. Lender, Countdown to Trial, Litigation, Spring 
2011, at 34, 36. 
91. See 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2026 (3d ed. 2010) (noting rule calls “for revelation of material 
that might be regarded in important senses as based on counsel’s opinion work product”). 
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with the court. 92  By contrast, the eve-of-trial previews under Rule 
26(a)(3) are also presented to the court,93 and they may well be a focus 
of discussion at the final pretrial conference.94  
Knowing that the disclosures must be filed with the court means less 
room for inadequate compliance. The parties cannot simply agree 
among themselves to ignore or downplay this requirement. Conversely, 
this preview scheme is also not something the parties could easily choose 
to do voluntarily. The fact that the court will receive and review the 
filings in the first place adds credibility to both the basic and the higher-
order information revealed. “This is our trial strategy” is harder for one 
side to communicate credibly to the other side in the absence of court 
involvement. It takes a judge to enforce the later exclusion of withheld 
evidence or waivers of objections. 
Judicial involvement also helps protect against overdisclosure. No 
doubt some parties would seek to dilute the precision of disclosures by 
listing every witness imaginable, but in the case of these eve-of-trial pre-
views, there are built-in incentives to provide focus, not fog. The domi-
nant reason is the presence of the judge: Parties know that these disclo-
sures will likely be reviewed by the judge, especially if the other side 
makes anticipatory objections. Overdisclosing could lead to disfavor from 
the judge; it will be transparent as a tactic (at least by trial time), and the 
judge herself may have used the disclosures in scheduling and preparing 
for the trial.95  
Most important is what the judges actually do with these previews. 
The judge will take note of the potential objections that the rule requires 
parties to announce; the judge may even begin to rule on these objec-
tions (if contingently) before trial. The judge may also instruct the 
parties as to which issues are to be focused on during trial and which 
other facts should be left uncontested. The judge may further hold a 
“rehearsal for the trial,” in effect, based on the previews.96 As noted in 
previous sections, these forms of judicial involvement can yield useful 
                                                                                                                 
92. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (“But disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or (2) and the 
following discovery requests and responses must not be filed until they are used in the 
proceeding or the court orders filing.”). 
93. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) (“[A] party must provide to the other parties and 
promptly file the following information about the evidence that it may present at trial 
other than solely for impeachment.”). 
94. See Civil Litigation Management Manual, supra note 32, at 100–06 (advising 
judges on preparing for and conducting final pretrial conference, including engaging with 
parties’ proposals of exhibits, witnesses, and objections, and explaining “final pretrial 
conference presents one last opportunity to discuss settlement with counsel and the 
parties, who may now realize for the first time the actual burdens going forward”). 
95. A further reason not to overdisclose is that what a party lists can constrain what 
that same party can itself object to; each side may be barred from objecting to witnesses or 
materials (listed by the other side) which it too has listed. 
96. Civil Litigation Management Manual, supra note 32, at 100. 
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clues or even direct answers for the parties about the likely outcome of 
trial. 
3. Late-Stage Previews. — The higher-order information that these 
previews provide tends to be less available at earlier stages. On the eve of 
trial, what will be contested is well known; issue formation is virtually 
complete. The raw evidentiary materials have been pored over, and the 
parties have at least started to craft their trial strategies. Even if earlier 
exchanges of information might have occurred (for instance, in medi-
ation or through discovery), these previews on the eve of trial are likely 
to deliver meta-information that would not have been known or revealed 
before. And then there is a pragmatic boost to the fullness of disclosure: 
At this late stage, there are fewer excuses for failing to anticipate what 
one “expects to” use at trial or what one might object to; the parties can-
not expect quite as easily to dodge waivers of undisclosed evidence or 
objections. 
4. Choosing to Opt Out. — Notably, the option in 1993 for individual 
districts to customize (or opt out of) the new rules was apparently 
intended for another rule about another type of disclosure—“initial 
disclosures” at the start of a lawsuit, meant to guide discovery, not trial.97 
It is far from clear that the rulemakers meant for customization to be an 
option for the eve-of-trial preview rule as well. The enabling language, 
“[e]xcept to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local 
rule,” only appeared in Rule 26(a)(1), the initial disclosure provision, 
and not in Rule 26(a)(3), the preview rule examined here.98 Nonethe-
less, a small number of districts creatively interpreted this option as 
covering the latter as well.99 One might view their choice to opt out of the 
preview rule as reflecting an objection to the new requirement, rather 
than simple inertia or a bias in favor of the status quo (indeed, some 
adopted variations on other disclosure rules, while opting out of this 
one100). It also suggests the degree of imposition on these opt-out 
                                                                                                                 
97. This is apparent in the way the 1993 rule was written. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) 
(1993) (amended 2000) (including opt-out provision in Rule 26(a)(1) on initial 
disclosures); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment 
(describing opt-out provision as directed at “initial disclosures” under Rule 26(a)(1), not 
pretrial disclsoures under Rule 26(a)(3)).  
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (1993) (amended 2000). Prior work has addressed the 
impact of adoption of this other disclosure rule, also making use of variation in the timing 
of adoption across jurisdictions. See Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A 
Controversial Device with No Effects, 21 Pace L. Rev. 203, 242–64 (2000) (using variation 
in 26(a)(1) in study concluding “mandatory disclosure neither expedites the litigation 
process nor promotes the trial rate”); see also Hayashi, supra note 44, at 49–50 (also 
making use of variation in 26(a)(1) initial disclosure rule). These studies do not address 
the 26(a)(3) previews studied here, which differ in nature, timing, and purpose. 
99. See Stienstra, supra note 23, at 10–28 (listing districts that opted out of Rule 
26(a)(1) and (3)).  
100. As noted below, for instance, the Central District of California adopted a 
modified version of Rule 26(a)(1), while opting out of Rule 26(a)(3). See id. at 10.  
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districts in 2000, when national uniformity was imposed and they were 
forced to catch up. 
B. Detecting the Preview Effect 
This study’s empirical strategy compares (1) the early adopters, 
those district courts that adopted the new preview rule during the first 
phase of reform, against (2) the late adopters, those districts that were 
forced to adopt the rule in late 2000, after initially opting out. It begins 
by focusing on one particularly “clean” and well-matched pair of districts 
in California. Then it expands the analysis to include other regional 
comparisons.  
Civil lawsuits in the broad private law categories of contracts, prop-
erty, and torts form the sample for this analysis. This sample is well 
diversified in subject matter and thus should be less vulnerable to shocks 
in any one area of law.101 The topics range widely, from product liability 
to copyright to banking and commerce. Cases in which the U.S. govern-
ment is a party are omitted because governmental litigation is often sub-
ject to atypical approaches to settlement.102 Roughly speaking, the sample 
used here corresponds to lawsuits typical in the common imagination: an 
individual suing a hospital for medical malpractice, or insurers suing 
each other regarding an industrial accident, or a creative artist suing for 
copyright violations. 
1. Data and Limitations. — This study uses administrative data from 
the U.S. federal courts, as collected and publicly distributed by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). The study window is from 
1996 to 2005, five years on either side of the policy change in 2000.103 
These AO data are a standard resource for researchers studying the 
federal justice system. The problems with these datasets are well docu-
mented,104 and this study takes care to avoid those pitfalls. Some short-
comings are unavoidable, however. Most notably, there is no reliable 
                                                                                                                 
101. Categories especially vulnerable to time shocks (asbestos and other class actions, 
securities litigation, and foreclosures or condemnations) are omitted.  
102. The anomalous nature of the federal government as a party in a case (for 
purposes of studying settlement decisions) is documented and used as part of the 
empirical strategy in Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: 
Further Tests of the Case Selection Model, 5 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 94 (2003).  
103. The early adopters implemented the rule by 1996. The “statistical years” in 
which these data are organized, and which this study follows, run from October to 
September (so that “2000” runs from October 1999 to September 2000).  
104. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1455, 1467–88 (2003) (noting various inaccuracies in AO dataset); Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and 
Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 705, 706–10 (2004) (noting difficulty of characterizing case dispositions as either 
settlement or nontrial adjudication, due to inconsistent coding in AO database, among 
other problems). 
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measure of settlements in the AO data, as an audit study by Gillian 
Hadfield has shown.105  
Fortunately, what is reliable in the AO data is the set of variables 
identifying whether a case reached a verdict in a bench or jury trial.106 
This variable, of course, is useful as a measure of the number of cases 
completing trial without settling. Moreover, it is broken down by bench 
verdicts versus jury verdicts. And this outcome measure is especially sen-
sible in the present context as a way of capturing changes in parties’ 
choices about whether to settle or go to trial: Given that the rule change 
in this policy experiment is one that affects the parties very shortly before 
trial, after motion practice is generally finished, there is less of a worry 
that observed changes in this outcome variable reflect changes in pretrial 
adjudication being prompted by the previews—and more confidence 
that it is measuring changes in the parties’ choices on the eve of trial. 
One difficulty, however, with studying civil cases during this time 
period is the strong and general declining trend in civil trials across the 
federal courts—that is, the “vanishing trial” phenomenon. 107  The 
percentage of filed civil cases that reach a trial of any kind is under five 
percent throughout the period; these trial rates start off low, and fall 
even lower.108 This poses a serious limitation: Due to the infrequent 
occurrence of trials, the outcome measures in this study are quite noisy. 
This noise in turn makes the underlying parameters harder to estimate 
with precision. This problem is compounded by the small number of dis-
tricts suitable for use in the analysis.  
In short, there are not many districts to work with, and the data are 
noisy within each district. To an extent, the design of the analysis can 
help to improve precision, given these external limitations. For instance, 
the use of fixed effects can control for time-specific factors, such as 
shared trends or the impact of uniform policy changes.109 Other back-
ground factors can be implicitly accounted for by running separate 
analyses for the different regional groupings of districts, by forming the 
                                                                                                                 
105. Hadfield, supra note 104, at 716–17. 
106. Hadfield explains: 
Counting trials as those in which a judgment was reached during or after a 
bench or jury trial ostensibly corresponds with the disposition coding ‘jury 
verdict,’ ‘court trial,’ or ‘directed verdict,’ and would appear to avoid the 
problem of counting as a ‘trial’ any contested evidentiary hearing. This will be of 
interest if we want to assess the rate at which cases are finally adjudicated by a 
trial. 
Id. at 712. 
107. See generally Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 14 (coining term “vanishing 
trial”); see also infra note 135 and accompanying text (describing phenomenon).  
108. See Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 14, at 461 (noting from 1985 to 2004 
cases “disposed of by trial” had fallen from 4.7% to 1.8%).  
109. “Fixed effects” here refers to the inclusion of dummy variables for the year of 
the data point. 
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comparison groupings with care, by focusing only on a well-chosen set of 
case categories, and by focusing on a time period closely surrounding the 
policy discontinuity. Nonetheless, this study is limited to reporting essen-
tially comparisons of means. 
Finally, a point that may be self-evident but bears emphasis: These 
data are used to assess average effects of adopting the preview rule, and 
not the effect of the use of previews in any individual case. It is not 
assumed, of course, that such previews are influential in every case,110 nor 
that every case reaching the eve of trial in any given district involved the 
use of evidentiary previews after the policy change.111 Cases vary, and if 
previews were unrevealing in some cases in the sample, or if some cases 
did not adhere to the rule, then the data presented here would be in a 
sense diluted—that is, these measures would understate the “true” 
impact of previews in those cases where they are used and do reveal new 
information.112 
2. Observing the Asymmetry. — An intuitive and straightforward 
measure is used to capture differential changes (if any) between bench 
cases and jury cases: the ratio of bench verdicts to jury verdicts. This out-
come is measured in a given district in a given year. Table 1 in the 
Appendix presents, in the right column, the summary statistics for this 
basic measure.113 
One main advantage of using this relative measure is worth empha-
sizing. Because the standard and behavioral stories predict opposite 
effects on the choice to go through with trial, simple measures of trial 
rates may mask the policy’s impact: The net of strong competing effects 
of similar sizes may be observationally indistinguishable from weak 
effects.114 (Note that the simple trial rates are also presented below, 
                                                                                                                 
110. Among other reasons, as previously noted, similar previewing may already have 
occurred at earlier “checkpoints” in litigation. And quite obviously, cases also vary in how 
much they turn on legal, as opposed to factual, questions; in the nature and extent of the 
previewed materials; in the degree of judicial engagement with those materials; in the 
costs of going to trial; and in numerous other ways related to the potential influence of the 
preview rule.  
111. To be clear, there is no implicit assumption that the comparison districts were 
using previews in every case; in this difference-in-differences framework, the assumption is 
instead that the comparison districts did not change their use of previews at the time of 
the mandatory catching-up by the policy-treated districts. The parallel assumption as to the 
policy-treated districts is that they increased their use of evidentiary previews as a result of 
the mandatory rule, and not that they had never used any form of previewing before the 
policy change or that they began using previews in every case after the policy change. 
112. Alternatively, one might see these factors as making it less plausible that the 
presented data overstate the impact in such cases. The same goes for the possibility that the 
treated districts were already using some forms of previewing before the policy change. 
113. See infra Table 1. All numbered tables and charts are contained in the 
Appendix. 
114. That is, measuring changes in trial rates due to the policy change will show only 
the net effect of the competing forces. The policy may have a large effect through both 
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nonetheless.) By contrast, as Part I explains, the two effects contribute to 
the bench-jury asymmetry in the same direction, rather than tending to 
cancel out.115 The relative measure can thus serve as a diagnostic for 
whether the preview rule is affecting settlement behavior, even if both of 
the opposing theories carry some truth and are thus exerting competing 
effects. (In addition, this relative measure also offers a more technical 
advantage: Even though the numbers of both bench trials and jury trials 
are falling over time, their ratio is in a sense a “normalized” measure, 
roughly invariant to the overall decline.116)  
Yet some limitations of the sample cannot be avoided. Trials have 
become somewhat rare events in the federal courts, and their number 
even in the larger districts is very small (as seen in the summary statistics 
in Table 1). The outcome measures are noisy, whether in the form of 
simple trial rates or a relative measure. Aggregating larger groups of dis-
tricts is one workaround, though it sacrifices the attractiveness of certain 
natural comparisons (such as districts within a circuit). Detailed below 
are comparisons representing a range of options along this matching-
versus-size tradeoff. 
3. The Cleanest Comparison. — Amid the messy variety of the custom-
izations among the districts after the 1993 reforms, one well-matched 
pair of districts is available for study that offers an especially “clean” test. 
The judicial district encompassing Los Angeles, the Central District of 
California (CDCA), opted out of the preview rule.117 Its adjacent neigh-
bor, the Northern District of California (NDCA), encompassing San 
Francisco, was an early adopter of the rule.118 They are both urban 
districts; they are of course in the same state as well as the same regional 
circuit (the Ninth Circuit); and they had similar caseloads per judge at 
the time of the study.119  
A further feature makes them a uniquely useful pairing to study. 
Focusing on them minimizes a possible complication. Recall that the new 
regime introduced in 1993 also included the “initial disclosure” rule. The 
content of this rule changed between the 1993 and the 2000 phases of 
reforms, but as it happens, the customized variant that both CDCA and 
NDCA chose for themselves (after opting out of the 1993 version) was a 
close approximation of the national version that came to be uniformly 
                                                                                                                 
the standard and the behavioral stories, but if these competing effects are roughly equal, 
the empirically observed effect may appear to be zero.  
115. See supra Part I.D (summarizing asymmetry).  
116. As a within-district ratio, the measure is also scale-invariant (as are trial rates) to 
the size of the districts being considered. 
117. Stienstra, supra note 23, at 10.  
118. Id. at 11.  
119. See Ninth Circuit United States Courts 2002 Annual Report 71–72 (2002), 
available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/AnnualReport2002.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting caseload measure of 534 per judgeship for 
CDCA and of 504 for NDCA).  
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required in 2000.120 As a result, in 2000, when nearly all other districts 
faced a significant change of some kind in their “initial disclosure” poli-
cies (whether they had opted in or out in 1993),121 both CDCA and 
NDCA largely escaped this extra policy shock. 
4. Further Comparisons. — Broadening the study sample to include 
other districts is useful as a check on this central comparison. Several 
geographic groupings of other late-adopting and early-adopting districts 
are described below; they aim to balance the need for greater sample size 
with the need for comparability. Chart 1, in the Appendix, lists the 
districts that form each of the selected groupings. (The tables are also 
organized to correspond to this chart.) There are two sets of natural 
groupings: The first extends the comparison between CDCA and NDCA 
to include other neighboring districts. A second natural grouping is 
found in the New England area, where three districts (Maine, Rhode 
Island, and the Northern District of New York) were late adopters 
affected by the “catch-up” mandate in 2000. 
a. California. — Aside from CDCA, there is another late-adopter dis-
trict in California: the Eastern District (EDCA), which contains 
Sacramento.122 Adding EDCA to the “treated” group increases the sample 
size. But doing so also entails some drawbacks: EDCA does not have the 
advantage that CDCA and NDCA have of having anticipated the 2000 
version of the “initial disclosure” rule. It also had a somewhat higher per-
judge caseload than the other two. Moreover, as it is a small district, its 
statistics on outcomes are noisier.123 (Such are the tradeoffs of expanding 
the sample.)  
Taking the “treated” group to be CDCA and EDCA combined, a very 
natural comparison group would be the two remaining California dis-
tricts, the NDCA and the Southern District (SDCA), which encompasses 
San Diego. Although this California-only comparison is intuitive, it too 
has a potential difficulty: SDCA was a pilot district for a number of 
related experimental reforms during the 1990s.124 For this reason, it may 
not be an ideal comparator. A useful substitute is the District of Oregon 
                                                                                                                 
120. In particular, after 1993 they each chose to use a modification of the Rule 
26(a)(1) mandatory initial disclosures requirement, limiting its application so that parties 
would not be required to disclose adverse information. See Stienstra, supra note 23, at 10–
11. This limitation became the national rule through the 2000 amendments to Rule 26. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
121. That is to say, most districts that implemented Rule 26(a)(1) mandatory initial 
disclosures after 1993 had to scale back when the 2000 amendments came into effect. Not 
so for CDCA and NDCA, however, as they had already modified the rule in a similarly 
scaled-back way. 
122. See Stienstra, supra note 23, at 10. 
123. This is not a problem for including it along with CDCA to form a larger 
“treated” group, but it is not useful as a stand-alone “treated” district. 
124. Plan of the Judges of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
California, 1991 WL 525124 (Oct. 7, 1991) (implementing requirements of Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990). 
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(OR), which is an adjacent neighbor of both the treated districts.125 
Including OR eliminates the advantage of being a California-only 
comparison, but at least the comparison remains within the Ninth 
Circuit. This cluster of four districts, comparing CDCA and EDCA against 
NDCA and OR, also happens to be an appealing match in that OR 
mirrors EDCA the same way NDCA mirrors CDCA: Like EDCA, OR 
opted out of the “initial disclosure” rule after 1993.126 If adding EDCA 
introduces the worry of complications from this other rule change, then 
in a crude sense this worry is counterbalanced by including OR on the 
other side.  
b. New England. — Maine (ME) and Rhode Island (RI) are two other 
late-adopting districts that have a natural comparison group: the other 
New England-area districts.127 Also in the region is the Northern District 
of New York (NDNY), which is adjacent to Massachusetts and Vermont; it 
too is a late-adopting district. These districts are all much smaller than 
those in the primary California comparison; they have far fewer trials and 
therefore much noisier outcome measures. Though their sample sizes 
(even when combined) are small, one might see them as supplying a 
double check of sorts—that is, as evidence that the California compari-
sons are not an isolated anomaly.  
The more limited version of the New England comparison considers 
only the other states that are also in the First Circuit: Massachusetts (MA) 
and New Hampshire (NH). This has the disadvantage of being smaller, 
but also the advantage of being in the same circuit and thus arguably 
better matched. A larger grouping considers all the area states taken to-
gether, adding three from the Second Circuit: NDNY, a late adopter, 
along with Connecticut (CT) and Vermont (VT), early adopters. 
C. Basic Findings 
The changes in the asymmetry between bench and jury cases, as cap-
tured by the ratio of bench verdicts to jury verdicts, can be seen in 
Figures 1 through 4. 128 Each point in the figures represents the ratio of 
bench verdicts to jury verdicts in civil private lawsuits, in either the treat-
ment or comparison group. In all figures, the vertical line represents a 
break between 2000 and 2001. The “catch-up” occurred in December 
2000 (which is just after the end of “statistical year 2000” in the data). 
Because the new rule applies to cases filed on or after its effective date, 
cases are counted based on their year of filing. Note, however, that at the 
judge’s discretion the rule could be applied to cases that were underway 
                                                                                                                 
125. See Stienstra, supra note 23, at 23. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 17, 24. 
128. These figures are found at the end of this Part. 
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on the effective date but had been filed earlier.129 For this reason, there 
may be some cases filed before the “line” that were also made subject to 
the rule. It is also plausible that some judges dragged in implementing a 
rule they had initially rejected. Thus one might expect the policy break 
to be somewhat blurred. 
1. The Asymmetric Impact. — The change in the frequency of bench 
trials relative to jury trials, after the policy change, is evident in these 
graphs. Figures 1 and 2 show the comparison between the treatment and 
control groups in the narrow California pairing (larger groupings show 
similar patterns). Figures 3 and 4 show the same for the limited New 
England grouping (larger groupings show similar patterns). A drop in 
the outcome measure after 2000 is apparent in the treated groups, both 
in absolute terms and relative to the comparison groups. By contrast, the 
same measure in the comparison groups seems either flat or slightly ris-
ing. A basic quantification of these visual comparisons is offered in Table 
2.130  
How do these observations relate to the theoretical stories explained 
in Part I? Recall the standard story’s prediction that previews should 
cause more of a fall in bench trials than in jury trials.131 In the behavioral 
story, previews should cause less of a rise in bench trials than in jury 
trials. The prediction they share is a relative fall in bench trials as com-
pared to jury trials.132 This is also the pattern seen in the data for both 
regional groups. The observed relative change in bench trials versus jury 
trials is consistent with the asymmetry prediction emerging from both 
theories of settlement as refined in Part I. In other words, the data sug-
gest that the adoption of the preview rule by a district court can affect 
litigants’ choices about whether to settle or to go to trial.  
2. Bench or Jury? — It remains to be seen whether this relative change 
is driven by a fall in bench trial numbers or a rise in jury trial numbers 
(or both). The answer may be taken as an indicator of whether—on 
net—the standard or behavioral effects appear to have greater force in 
each set of cases. Notably, however, because opposing effects are hypoth-
esized to be in play, signs of a net rise or net fall should not be taken to 
mean that only one competing theory is “right.” With this in mind, the 
estimates in Table 3 indicate that adoption of the preview rule corre-
sponded to a net fall in bench trials. The estimates also hint at a net rise 
in jury trials, but these jury trial measures are too imprecise to be taken 
as informative on their own. Altogether, these estimates support the con-
vergence effect in the standard account, while saying little about the 
divergence effect in the behavioral account. 
                                                                                                                 
129. See Stienstra, supra note 23, at 26 (noting local rules or orders “may specify 
whether the federal rules apply only to newly filed cases or also to pending cases”).  
130. Table 2 is presented and the quantification explained in the Appendix, infra. 
131. See supra Part I.B.  
132. See supra Part I.B. 
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3. Motivating Further Inquiry. — This appears to be the first study to 
examine the impact of imposing eve-of-trial previews under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3). A causal interpretation of the impact of 
adopting the preview rule can be supported by this study’s natural 
experiment design. It is worth repeating, however, that this study’s 
design does not aim to identify the effect of switching between bench and 
jury trials or of assigning a given case to one or the other.133 Yet the 
observed asymmetry may motivate complementary future research 
focusing on causal interpretation of the jury-versus-bench difference. 
This is sure to be difficult using observational data, because parties are 
usually given the choice of a bench or jury trial. Moreover, as noted 
above, there are many obvious reasons why bench cases and jury cases 
might generally differ. But the use of controlled experiments, similar to 
those which undergird the behavioral economists’ countertheory 
described in Part I,134 may be an alternative approach. Reaching beyond 
the bench-versus-jury dichotomy, future experiments or study designs 
should also aim to test the effect of varying forms and degrees of previewing 
the audience. Notably, the “accidental” policies described in the 
following Part might offer sources of policy variation that can be useful 
for further empirical study. 
                                                                                                                 
133. As Part I notes, the parties in each case choose whether it will go to a jury, by 
making a jury demand at the start of litigation. In 2000, parties had only 10 days to 
demand a jury trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) (amended 2009). One advantage of this study’s 
focus on Rule 26(a)(3) previews is that, by the eve of trial, the status of a case as a bench 
case or jury case has long been decided. It is difficult to switch between bench and jury late 
in litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) (“The failure of a party to serve and file a demand as 
required by this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury.”); 9 Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2334 (3d ed. 2008) (noting 
judicial resistance in federal courts to late-in-litigation switching from bench to jury trial). 
This fact reduces the possible endogeneity concern that the observed changes are due to 
parties switching between bench and jury status on the eve of trial. There does remain the 
theoretical possibility that some parties, at the pleadings stage, may make a jury demand 
decision based on whether Rule 26(a)(3) previews might someday occur on the eve of 
trial. Such behavior should be quite rare, given how distant (and statistically improbable) 
the prospect of trial is likely to seem to parties at the very start of litigation, and also given 
the more salient reasons for choosing a judge or a jury as the factfinder. See supra Part 
I.B.2. 
134. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.  
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FIGURE 1. — CALIFORNIA “TREATED” DISTRICT (CLEANEST MATCH) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. — CALIFORNIA “COMPARISON” DISTRICT (CLEANEST MATCH) 
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FIGURE 3. — NEW ENGLAND “TREATED” DISTRICTS (FIRST CIRCUIT) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. — NEW ENGLAND “COMPARISON” DISTRICTS (FIRST CIRCUIT) 
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III. POLICY CONCERNS: OPENING THOUGHTS  
This Essay’s core idea—that previewing evidence before trial may 
have more informational impact when the factfinder is already present in 
the case—engages a range of current policy concerns, including the con-
tinuing alarm about “vanishing trials”;135 the desire to guide settlement 
choices through civil procedure;136 and persistent worries about judicial 
idiosyncrasy, bias, and discretion. These are familiar and enduring issues. 
While surveying the extensive arguments made about any of these con-
cerns is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is worth a few words here to 
explore how an appreciation of preview effects might influence our 
thinking in these areas in subtle and not always intuitive ways.  
This Part begins by addressing some of the normative values in play, 
introducing two tensions amplified by preview policies: first, a tradeoff 
between seeking “accuracy” and avoiding “idiosyncrasy” in settlement 
                                                                                                                 
135. Marc Galanter first examined the “vanishing trial” phenomenon in his seminal 
article, The Vanishing Trial. Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 14, at 460 (presenting 
empirical evidence indicating absolute number of trials has declined sharply). For a 
sampling of further work by leading scholars, see Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials 
and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or 
Gomorrah?, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 591, 592 (2004) (presenting evidence providing 
“reasonable basis to conclude that the rate of case termination by summary judgment in 
federal civil cases nationwide increased substantially in the period between 1960 and 
2000”); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 
119, 120 (2002) (summarizing empirical findings for six phases of trial); Marc Galanter, 
The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years of War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 
1256 (2005) (noting “long-term decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trial” and 
“a steep drop in the absolute number of trials during the past twenty years”); Hadfield, 
supra note 104 (performing audit study of AO dataset to correct misperceptions of 
vanishing trial phenomenon); Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The 
Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 783, 785 (2004) (comparing competing explanations); Kent Syverud, ADR and the 
Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1935, 1936–37 (1997) (presenting 
data suggesting “number of civil jury trials is . . . becoming insignificant”). The issue has 
also reached the broader media and the trade press. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, 
The “Vanishing Trial”: The College, the Profession, the Civil Justice System 1 (2004) 
(examining implications for trial lawyers); Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The 
Vanishing Trial, Litigation, Winter 2004, at 2, 2 (describing Marc Galanter’s work and 
mentioning “blizzard” of publicity covering vanishing trial phenomenon); Nathan Koppel, 
Trial-less Lawyers: As More Cases Settle, Firms Seek Pro Bono Work to Hone Associates’ 
Courtroom Skills, Wall St. J. (Dec. 1, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB113340490977810989.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing large 
firms’ attempts to provide courtroom experience for associates in wake of declining 
numbers of trials). 
136. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1713, 1717 (2012) (examining “maladaptiveness” of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
to increased incidence of settlement outcomes); Miller, Preliminary Judgments, supra 
note 7, at 167 (proposing “preliminary judgment” as mechanism for settlement reform); 
Nagareda, supra note 7, at 650 (examining “distortive effect that our modern civil process 
might exert upon the pricing of claims in a world dominated by settlement, not trial”). 
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outcomes; and second, a dilemma of sorts facing policymakers who seek 
to level the litigating field between more and less sophisticated parties. 
These tensions arise from the audience-driven nature of the preview 
effects articulated in Part I. The analysis then turns to the practical 
realities of the accelerated—and asymmetric—“vanishing” of trials, as 
documented in Part II. It imagines how rulemakers of different persua-
sions might respond to the wedge that previews may drive between bench 
cases and jury cases.  
Finally, this Part concludes with an exploratory survey of how civil 
procedure might manage the degree of “previewing the judge” and “pre-
viewing the jury”: How can the judge or even the jury be made more (or 
less) of a known quantity before trial? Existing procedural devices already 
serve these functions, in fact—if in an accidental, unintentional way. A 
sensitivity to audience-driven preview effects and their potential asym-
metry can motivate and inform the more conscious use of such policies.  
A. Procedural Values 
It occurred to us that this false assumption [that knowing an 
appellate panel’s composition can help predict the outcome] 
might lead some parties to settle their claims to avoid certain 
panels. We were happy to accommodate those who might thus 
settle their cases and thereby reduce our caseload.137 
—Judge Harry Edwards 
 
By revealing information both about the evidence and about a spe-
cific factfinder’s inclinations, could preview policies be inducing settle-
ments at the expense of more neutral outcomes? Moreover, could pre-
views worsen imbalances among parties—sophisticated versus naïve, 
repeat players versus one-timers, richer versus poorer? These questions of 
procedural values are taken in turn. 
1. The Shadow of Idiosyncrasy. — At first blush, it may seem that pre-
views should improve the accuracy of the civil justice system, for the 
simple reason that previews make more information available by the time 
the parties settle. (Here, the term “accuracy” refers to the conventional 
meaning that the settlement outcome reflects the true merits of the 
case.) And this accuracy gain would seem to apply both when settlement 
is prompted by the previews and when the parties would have settled 
anyway but are doing so in a more informed way.  
                                                                                                                 
137. Letter from Harry T. Edwards, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, to J. Robert Brown, Jr., Professor, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law (Sept. 24, 
1998), quoted in J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges 
at the Court of Appeals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1037, 1109 n.421 (2000). Judge Edwards is 
explaining one advantage of the D.C. Circuit’s practice of early panel announcement. See 
Jordan, supra note 13, at 60 (discussing effects of early panel announcements on 
settlement).  
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In fact, one might speculate that allowing the use of previews should 
tend to improve public perceptions of a civil justice system—increasing 
its legitimacy—precisely because settlement outcomes would be seen as 
being better informed and thus more accurate. Settlement terms would 
turn less on the external bargaining asymmetries, for instance, and more 
on the merits. Such accuracy gains could even be seen as a counterweight 
to the legitimacy losses that some observers would perceive in a decline 
in trial-going rates.  
But that may be too simplistic. There is a tradeoff, one that should 
trouble even those who generally favor settlement. Consider why pre-
viewing the case materials and previewing the factfinder are comp-
lements in the first place: Different judges may vary in how they assess 
the same body of evidence or how they decide the same case. This is why 
it is valuable to the parties, in bench cases, to have a “judicial preview” (a 
signal of what the previewed evidence means to this factfinder). But there 
is also a downside: The use of preview policies can amplify the influence 
of such individual variation among judges—call it “idiosyncrasy”—on 
settlement outcomes.138  
Parties settle not in the shadow of the “true facts” about the case, 
after all, but in the shadow of the expected verdict.139 And they know that 
this verdict will depend both on the factual materials and on how this 
specific factfinder will interpret them. When judicial previews are 
possible, the enhanced learning that results may induce settling—but 
partly because the parties are gaining insight into how this judge thinks. 
And as Judge Edwards’s ambivalence in the epigraph above suggests,140 a 
policy of pushing settlement by exploiting perceptions about judicial 
idiosyncrasy may not be a widely palatable approach. 
To put the question bluntly: Should the parties have more infor-
mation or should they have “purer” (but less) information? Using pre-
views allows parties to make their settlement decisions based on a sharper 
sense of how the case will come out at trial, but this sharper sense might 
be taking into account the idiosyncratic views of the judge (or jury). The 
alternative is for them to settle (or not) based on a fuzzier sense of the 
outcome, but at least this fuzzier sense will be less influenced by idio-
syncrasy.  
A closer analysis begins by distinguishing among three groups of 
                                                                                                                 
138. I should emphasize that by “idiosyncrasy” I mean individual variation, and not 
outlier status or unusual views. 
139. “True facts” is a memorable phrase borrowed from Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 
495, 506 (1947) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to enable the 
parties to discover the true facts and to compel their disclosure whenever they may be 
found.”). 
140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. The ambivalence is evident in Judge 
Edwards’s need to sidestep the troubling aspect of such a settlement promotion strategy by 
making clear he thinks it is a “false assumption” that judicial identity partially determines 
(and thus is useful for predicting) case outcomes.  
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cases affected by previews: First, previews may cause some cases to settle 
that otherwise would have gone through trial; second, previews may 
cause other cases to settle earlier than they otherwise would; third, there 
are cases that will settle at the same stage of litigation as they would have 
done in the absence of previews. 
It is easy to be overly complacent about the first group of cases. The 
potential for judicial idiosyncrasy to influence settlement might not seem 
terribly troubling for cases that would otherwise have completed trial. In 
these cases, the choice is between verdicts influenced by idiosyncrasy 
versus settlements influenced by idiosyncrasy; what is really lost in shift-
ing the distortion forward in time? Yet accuracy may still suffer in these 
cases, in the obvious way—if trial serves enough of a truth-seeking func-
tion to draw out further merits-related facts or interpretation (including 
impeachment of bad information) that would not have been apparent 
from previews alone.  
The risk of information loss is not limited, however, to cases other-
wise headed to trial. Consider the second group of cases: those that 
would have settled anyway, but instead settle earlier thanks to previews. 
Acceleration of settlement can thwart accuracy by cutting off further 
learning about the “true facts” of the case. As with the first group of 
cases, previews may supplant facts with idiosyncrasy, if parties settle sooner 
because they already have enough of a guess of what this particular judge 
will find (even though there is more factual information left to be un-
covered).  
Next consider the third group of cases: those that settle, but no 
earlier than they otherwise would. Even for these cases, distortion is still 
possible—not in settlement timing, but in settlement terms. In the 
absence of previews, some of these cases might otherwise have settled on 
terms based on a more “neutral” guess of the outcome. But once they 
gain some insight about their specific factfinder’s reactions to the trial 
materials (thanks to the previews), the parties can incorporate this fact-
finder specific information in setting settlement terms. It is possible that 
these idiosyncrasy-influenced terms might not reflect the merits of the 
case as closely as would a less informed, more neutral guess. If so, even 
though there is no information loss due to accelerated settlement for this 
third group of cases, an accuracy-idiosyncrasy tradeoff still exists. 
In sum, the prospect of more settlements is not the only relevant 
effect. Previews can also magnify idiosyncrasy’s influence even in a case 
bound to settle anyway. Previews pierce the veil of neutrality for these 
cases, too. They can thus alter the terms of settlements, even if the aggre-
gate number of settlements is unchanged. The fact that “most cases 
already settle” does not mean there is less cause for concern—but possi-
bly more. 
What might moderate the tradeoff are two conditions. First, of 
course, the tradeoff depends on how much room there is for judicial 
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idiosyncrasy to matter in a given case. For the sort of case in which all 
judges likely judge alike, there should be little worry.141 But many kinds 
of cases are not like that. Parties do care which forum is chosen and 
which jurors are seated; society frets over which judges are appointed. 
Not every decision will be identical to the average decision. There may be 
an objective core in a given case, but also a component subject to judicial 
idiosyncrasy. The possibility remains in many cases that previews might 
project these idiosyncrasies onto settlements. 
Second, if the actual factfinder is not yet known at the time of settle-
ment (think jury cases), then there should be less worry about idio-
syncrasy affecting a settlement’s likelihood or its terms via preview effects. 
This may seem obvious in the case of jury cases, but it is also relevant to 
bench cases. In particular, it should be a key consideration in the design 
and use of potential procedural tools for regulating how much the 
parties can “preview the judge” before a bench trial; a number of these 
devices will be explored in Part III.C. 
One more word about the tradeoff is in order: Society’s interests and 
private interests might not align when it comes to the choice between 
accuracy and idiosyncrasy. One reason is that society might benefit from 
accuracy in ways that are not internalized by the parties, who may under-
standably seek a quicker resolution rather than a more accurate one. 
Consider, for instance, that some parties may be able to insure or other-
wise hedge against accuracy distortions; if so, their main concern in any 
given case would be to minimize litigation costs, including by settling in 
the shadow of judicial idiosyncrasy. Society has interests in accuracy—
including the potential “shadow” cast by settlement outcomes on future 
cases 142  as well as more general concerns about publicity or legiti-
macy143—that may not be assumed to be protected by the choices of pri-
vate parties.  
2. Imbalances Between Parties. — What if one party in a case is less 
capable of making sense of judicial clues? The sophisticated, well-
resourced, or repeat player—that is, the “insider”—may be expected to 
have an advantage when it comes to anticipating what it means to have a 
certain judge in the case. Consider this further implication: If the impact 
of previewing trial materials depends in part on knowing the audience 
for them, could such previews also magnify the effects of variations 
among parties knowing how specific judges think? 
                                                                                                                 
141. For instance: cases that are utterly routine, bound by inflexible rules, or simply 
impossible for one side to win. 
142. See Glover, supra note 136, at 1745–50 (describing “shadow of settlement” 
enabled by modern databases of settlement outcomes). 
143. As to publicity, think of cases concerning health or safety in which early 
settlements (or settlements instead of trial) may prevent useful information from coming 
to public light. As to legitimacy, one might expect it to be promoted by perceptions of 
accuracy—that is, by a belief that settlements tend to reflect true merits.  
1364 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1323 
  
The complementarity between knowing the evidence and knowing 
the audience, as articulated in Part I, also links the effects of not knowing 
one or the other. The irony is that, while evidentiary previews might help 
“level the field” as to informational asymmetries about the facts of a case, 
they might also implicitly amplify any inequality in parties’ knowledge 
about the judge.  
A further dimension of choice concerning “judicial previews” comes 
to the fore in this analysis: how explicitly the judge articulates signals 
about her views of the case as previewed. Thus far, in theorizing about 
the effects of previews in bench cases, we have not relied on any sharp 
distinction between the parties’ guessing what this judge will think of the 
disclosed materials (based on her past rulings or her known inclinations) 
and the parties’ hearing it directly from the judge. Yet the distinction 
matters if some parties are better at such guesswork than others are.  
To level the field along this axis, then, it may be necessary to direct 
policymaking and judicial attention to the question of how expressly 
judges signal their views. Many considerations attend this choice,144 but 
the possibility of audience-driven preview effects adds one more to the 
mix. At least, the potential to worsen inequalities should be kept in mind 
in assessing those procedural tools (raised later in this Essay) that reg-
ulate how much the parties can “preview the judge.”145  
B. The Asymmetric Vanishing of Trials 
Not all trials “vanish” alike—even in response to the same policy 
shock. An asymmetry is evident in the policy experiment studied in Part 
II: Imposing the preview rule may have accelerated a decline in bench 
trials relative to jury trials. Such an asymmetry suggests the potential for 
“decoupling”—making use of policies that can affect one set of cases but 
not another. How a policymaker may want to design or apply such 
policies depends of course on her views about the desirability of 
settlements generally and of the observed asymmetric vanishing of trials 
in particular, including whether she is more concerned about jury trials 
or bench trials. But whatever her views may be, she should consider how, 
in light of the dual theories articulated in Part I, preview policies for 
bench and jury cases might be decoupled.  
The most vocal laments about the decline of civil trials seem to be 
focused on the vanishing jury trial (with little concern about bench trials, 
vanishing or not).146 These judges and scholars favor the robust use of 
                                                                                                                 
144. See, for instance, the debates over the judicial role in settlements, as considered 
later in this Essay, infra Part III.C.1. 
145. See infra Part III.C.  
146. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Margaret H. Downie & Larry C. Zervos, Judges’ 
Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 Judicature 306, 308 (2005) (describing “decline of civil 
trial by jury in federal court [as] tragic” and “loss of this stunning experiment in direct 
popular rule . . . [as] catastrophic for the nation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
2013] TRIAL BY PREVIEW 1365 
  
the civil jury, perhaps seeing the jury trial as a source of legitimacy or 
resilience for the justice system. These observers might view the findings 
in Part II as somewhat reassuring: The newly mandated previews, while 
diverting bench cases away from trial, did not seem to cause much if any 
decline in jury trials. This naturally decoupling policy appears to be 
shielding the cases of greater concern. But here is an instance in which 
theory matters, and more research into the strength of the competing 
mechanisms may be critical to normative assessment: If the asymmetry is 
being driven in part by an enhanced self-serving bias due to previews, 
then one must ask whether the seeming preservation of jury trials should 
be celebrated, given the distortionary mechanism that may be its cause.147  
In contrast to those policymakers who are partial to jury trials, others 
might see the need for an artificial decoupling policy. Consider a policy-
maker who is worried by vanishing trials both in bench cases and in jury 
cases. Or imagine one who is actually more concerned about vanishing 
bench trials—perhaps seeing them as a better form of adjudication, or as 
supplying raw material for the creation of case law,148 or as a source of 
publicity for socially useful information.149 These observers, whose main 
worry might then be the amplified impact of previews in bench cases, 
might seek to design or adjust preview policies to compensate against the 
naturally occurring asymmetry between jury cases and bench cases. Such 
measures might take the form of more tightly limiting what is previewed 
in bench cases than in jury cases (at least as a default, subject to case-by-
case adjustments). The preview rules could be altered, for instance, to 
require less pretrial disclosure, to limit the types of materials that need to 
be disclosed, or to limit the judge’s exposure to the disclosed materials—
similar to exchanges of materials during discovery, which generally are 
not filed with the court.150 Radical though this sort of discriminatory rule 
might seem, it is analogous to those current rules of evidence that have a 
greater impact in jury cases (and purposefully so), such as those meant to 
                                                                                                                 
Miller, Pretrial Rush, supra note 6, at 1134 (arguing judicial efficiency should not justify 
limiting access to trial and jury adjudication); William G. Young, A Lament for What Was 
Once and Yet Can Be, 32 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 305, 309 (2009) (expressing concern 
over decline of jury trial); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing 
Constitution, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 67, 92 (2006) (arguing juries are “purest form of 
democracy known to humankind”). 
147. Whether the premise is true, however, is not answered by the results in Part II; 
the data neither rule out divergence effects predicted by the behavioral story, nor provide 
solid evidence of them. One might speculate, but only speculate, that such divergence 
effects are occurring in some cases but are on average neutralized by convergence effects. 
148. Such an observer might think that bench trials, resulting in judicial opinions 
with a fuller statement of facts and reasoning than jury trials, might both be more appeal-
friendly and also lend themselves to use by an appeals court in setting precedent.  
149. Think of cases involving safety or health risks, for instance. 
150. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (requiring certain papers be filed after service but listing 
disclosure and discovery requests and responses that “must not be filed until they are used 
in the proceeding or the court orders filing”).  
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shield juries from inflammatory evidence.151  
Finally, what about those policymakers who favor settlement—those 
who approve of the vanishing of trials? The analysis for them would be in 
a sense a straightforward reversal of the positions above. But one point is 
especially notable. If the effects proposed by the behavioralists’ diver-
gence story are shown to exist, then from this policy perspective it may be 
seen as doubly advantageous to limit previews in jury cases: first, because 
doing so would avoid fueling self-serving biases among litigants; and 
second, because the result would be more settlement. This possibility 
raises, again, the need for further evaluation of the strengths of the 
competing theorized effects. 
From any of these policymaking perspectives, the basic lesson is the 
same: The choice of whether to permit previews, and of what kind and 
degree, can be made to depend on whether the case is heading to a 
judge or a jury as the finder of fact.152 Beyond the design of evidentiary 
preview policies, however, a broader set of tools may also have some use. 
After all, the informational complementarities at stake depend both on 
previewing the evidence and on previewing the audience. The following 
sections describe procedural devices that might be used directly to influ-
ence the latter—to dial up or down the parties’ exposure to the fact-
finder in their case, whether judge or jury. 
C. Previewing the Judge 
How can procedure or practice affect what the parties know about 
their judge—or even about their future jury—before trial? How can the 
complementary effects of judicial previews be managed through proce-
dural tools? Are analogous “jury preview” tools possible? Of course, what 
can be known about the future finder of fact does not break cleanly 
along the bench versus jury divide. Yet the dichotomy matters in the con-
text of policymaking because the tools for making the future audience 
more (or less) well known before trial do tend to differ between bench 
cases and jury cases.  
Such policy levers already exist, in fact. They are not imaginary 
devices but procedures that have long been in use. Wittingly or not, then, 
we have already been making implicit policy choices about the infor-
                                                                                                                 
151. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). In fact, some courts have ruled 
that Rule 403 applies only to jury cases, and not to bench cases. See United States v. 
Preston, 706 F.3d 1106, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 403 is inapplicable to bench trials.” 
(citing EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 1994); Schultz v. Butcher, 24 
F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994))). More generally, of course, such evidentiary rules require a 
judge to confront the very evidence that she may then decide should be kept away from 
the jury. 
152. More generally, perhaps such policy choices could be made with an eye to how 
much the parties are likely to know about their trial audience, whether judge or jury.  
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mational value of previews. Let us start with those existing devices that 
determine how much the parties can “preview the judge.” 
1. Judge Rotation. — First, jurisdictions vary widely in whether or not a 
single judge will see the case through. Some use a master calendar sys-
tem, with “motion judges” handling cases throughout litigation until they 
are scheduled for trial; only then is the trial judge assigned.153 Motion 
judges may even be rotated within a given case.154 This scheme makes it 
difficult to get to know (or even to know the identity of) the judge who 
will eventually preside at trial. Parties cannot rely on motion judges’ 
pretrial decisions as indicative of their prospects at trial, because there is 
no guarantee any of the motion judges making pretrial decisions will end 
up making decisions at the trial phase.  
By contrast, other courts use an individual calendar system, assigning 
a judge at the beginning of a case who will take it “from start to finish.”155 
Federal courts operate on this model of “case management,” in which a 
single judge handles a case from its inception and is actively involved in 
managing the case from an early stage156 (though judicial rotation of a 
sort may occur if a case bounces between a district judge and a magistrate 
judge or special master). A review of Minnesota state courts documents 
the advantages one might expect of assigning a single judge, finding that 
the use of the individual calendar system in one county enabled judges to 
be “better informed about each case and better able to achieve early 
resolution of the cases.”157 Presumably, such a start-to-finish judge is also 
                                                                                                                 
153. See, e.g., Master Calendar, Superior Court of Cal., County of Sacramento, 
http://www.saccourt.ca.gov/general/virtual-courthouse/downtown/master-calendar.aspx 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (describing use of 
master calendar system to assign cases to judicial officers). The Louisiana Supreme Court 
has urged randomized case assignment at a later point expressly to avoid exploitation of 
the calendaring system in a “judge-shopping game.” Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in 
Adjudication, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 46 (2009). Some of the busiest New York courts 
even wait to assign a case to a trial judge until after jury selection has been completed. Ann 
Pfau, N.Y. State Judicial Inst., Comprehensive Civil Justice Program 2005: Study and 
Recommendations 40 (2005). 
154. This is the case in Massachusetts state courts. See Peter M. Lauriat, Superior 
Court Rule 9A Is Working, 39 Bos. B.J. 24, 25 n.3 (1995) (noting Massachusetts Bar 
Association’s recommendation to adopt rotation system for motion judges).  
155. For instance, Hawaii state courts recently moved to an individual calendar 
system from a master calendar system, and now assign cases to a judge immediately. This 
means an individual judge handles the case “from start to finish,” eliminating the need for 
motion judges. Ed Kemper, Judge Chang on the New Individual Calendar System, 4 Haw. 
B.J. 5, 5 (2000). 
156. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1561, 1587–89 (2003) (describing development of case management approach). The 
federal courts began this development in the early 1980s based on the practices of 
metropolitan courts in the late 1960s. See id. at 1587 (“Given responsibility from start to 
finish, judges in these [city courts] began to call the lawyers in for conferences early in the 
case to plan the handling of the case.”). 
157. Robert J. Sheran & Douglas K. Amdahl, Minnesota Judicial System: Twenty-Five 
Years of Radical Change, 26 Hamline L. Rev. 219, 242 (2003) (emphasis omitted). 
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more likely to become a known quantity to the parties during the pretrial 
phase. 
2. Judge Announcement. — Second, jurisdictions vary in how early dur-
ing a case parties are told who their trial judge will be. The contrasting 
policies for panel announcement in the federal appeals courts are the 
most familiar instance. The D.C. Circuit famously (and uniquely, among 
its peers) makes a point of announcing the three-judge panel assigned to 
a given appeal very early, close in time to the filing of the notice of 
appeal.158 As noted, one express aim is to promote settlement by letting 
the parties know who their audience will eventually be.  
As observed above, however, such audience-driven settlement effects 
entail the cost of accepting a greater influence of judicial idiosyncrasy on 
the likelihood or the terms of a settlement. Moreover, this approach 
relies on “insider” knowledge about the judges in a jurisdiction; the 
result may be a further tipping of the balance in favor of repeat players 
or sophisticated parties, who may know more about a given judge’s incli-
nations and can better anticipate how this judge might respond to the 
trial materials.  
3. Judicial Role in Settlement. — Third, courts also vary as to how much 
of a role the future trial judge is allowed to play in settlement nego-
tiations before trial. A half-century ago, Judge Skelly Wright unabashedly 
told war stories about informing parties of what he thought to be the 
settlement value of a case.159 Not everyone found the practice agreeable: 
Judge Charles Clark remarked that settlement negotiations “are no part 
of proper pre-trial” as they bring the judge’s impartiality into question.160 
These differences of opinion have persisted. Today, views in the state 
courts vary.161 At least two state supreme courts have held that a trial 
judge involved in failed settlement talks may not preside over a sub-
sequent bench trial without the parties’ consent.162 In federal courts, 
                                                                                                                 
158. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 13, at 58 (noting D.C. Circuit’s aim of promoting 
settlement by announcing panel for given appeal well in advance—within sixty days of 
filing). 
159. Honorable J. Skelly Wright, The Pretrial Conference, in Proceedings of the 
Seminar on Practice and Procedure Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (July 5–9, 
1960), 28 F.R.D. 37, 141, 145. 
160 . Honorable Charles E. Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, in 
Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration (July 10–
12, 1961), 29 F.R.D. 191, 454, 455–56. 
161. See Peter Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate About Judges 
Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 335, 367 
(finding confusion in law regarding judges’ roles in pretrial settlement). 
162. See Timm v. Timm, 487 A.2d 191, 193 (Conn. 1985) (“When a judge engages in 
pretrial settlement discussion . . . he should automatically disqualify himself from 
presiding in the case . . . .”); Shields v. Thunem, 716 P.2d 217, 219 (Mont. 1986) (noting 
growing trend of trial judges participating in pretrial settlement). 
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judges are not generally barred from involvement in settlement;163 the 
practice of disqualification is largely unguided apart from the general 
ethical reminders in judicial manuals. 
Notably, the divide between bench trials and jury trials has been con-
sidered in this policymaking area, but for a different reason than that 
emphasized here. The existing concern has been about the judge’s 
impartiality later at trial; this is the familiar worry about the “managerial 
judge” who may develop views about the case, having been exposed to 
facts in the informal context of settlement,164 making it hard to return to 
neutral at trial.165 And this risk is said to be greater in bench cases. An 
advisory opinion of the Judicial Conference says that one factor in 
deciding how involved the judge should be is “a consideration of whether 
the case will be tried by judge or jury.”166 The worry is “whether the judge 
can set aside this knowledge [gained during settlement talks] in a case 
tried to the judge”; by contrast, “[e]thical concerns are less likely to arise 
when a judge handles settlement negotiations and then presides over a 
jury trial.”167 The premise, of course, is that judges have less influence 
over outcomes in jury cases.168  
A policy that implements this distinction would be a further illus-
tration of a device for forcible or artificial “decoupling,” as imagined 
                                                                                                                 
163. See Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 95: Judges Acting in a 
Settlement Capacity (2009), reprinted in 2B Guide to Judiciary Policy ch. 2, at 95-1, 95-3 
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion No. 95], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
rulesandpolicies/conduct/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last 
revised Mar. 21, 2013) (“[S]ettlement practices must be examined on a case-by-case basis 
to determine their ethical propriety.”). 
164. See, e.g., Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?—The Need for a Clearer 
Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 Ariz. St. L.J. 45, 55 (1994) (noting increase in judicial use 
of “caucusing” during settlement negotiations); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
Harv. L. Rev. 374, 426–31 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial] (noting judges may 
gain information during pretrial conferences unfiltered by rules of evidence and possibly 
outside presence of opposing parties). 
165. See Brunet, supra note 10, at 246–48 (describing perception of lack of neutrality 
following judge’s effort to settle matters); Resnik, Managerial, supra note 164, at 433 
(“[M]anagerial judges come into close contact with attorneys and, by virtue of that 
contact, hear opinion, innuendo, and rumor—all of which may affect their findings of fact 
and their rulings of law.”). 
166. Advisory Opinion No. 95, supra note 163, at 95-3; see also Robert J. Niemic, 
Donna Stienstra & Randall E. Ravitz, Guide to Judicial Management of Cases in ADR 78–
79 (2001) (discussing advisory opinion emphasizing judges should be mindful of 
objectivity). 
167. Advisory Opinion No. 95, supra note 163, at 95-2 to -3. 
168. The same logic implies that there is less concern in cases in which the judge has 
no further dispositive motions to decide. As one manual for federal judges summarizes, 
“The safest stance, if you wish to host settlement discussions in your own cases, is to limit 
your participation to cases that will be tried to a jury and only those cases in which case-
dispositive motions have been decided.” Civil Litigation Management Manual, supra note 
32, at 89.  
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above (even if its current motivation is something different). 169  By 
barring the settlement judge from presiding over a bench trial but not a 
jury trial, such a policy may tend to level the observed asymmetry in pre-
view effects. Whether this leveling is desirable depends, again, on one’s 
normative views about settlement versus trial, about the relative merits of 
bench trials and jury trials, and about the accuracy-idiosyncrasy tradeoff 
articulated above.  
D. Previewing the Jury? 
What about getting to know the jury before trial? This seems a very 
different, and more difficult, problem. How well the parties can get to 
know their judge can be boosted or suppressed through pretrial policies 
and practices, as explained above. But, at first blush, it may seem that the 
same cannot be done with a jury, as jurors are not usually chosen until 
trial begins. There is no way to identify which individuals will be sitting in 
the jury box, much less catch a glimpse of their reactions, before trial. 
For the most part, a future jury just cannot be made as well known as the 
judge; there is a jury-bench gap not only in the informational baseline 
(the trial judge is better known than the future jury), but also in the tools 
available for manipulating it (the future jury cannot easily be made more 
known).  
Yet some alternatives do exist. First, procedure can influence how 
well the parties know the general profile of the jury pool in the juris-
diction. It can also influence what parties anticipate learning about their 
actual jury after trial begins. This anticipation of future learning during 
trial, as explained below, can alter settlement behavior even before trial. 
1. Approximation and Anticipation. — Litigants are not entirely in the 
dark about their future jury. A general profile can be inferred from data 
about the jury pool.170 Forum shopping happens, after all. Famously, cer-
tain venues have achieved folkloric status for their citizens’ hostility 
toward patent infringers, say, or generosity in assigning punitive 
damages.171 Besides, an experienced litigator may know what will play 
                                                                                                                 
169 . See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text (discussing potential 
decoupling policies for policymakers wishing to mitigate vanishing of bench trials).  
170. See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 42 (documenting empirical data and anecdotes). 
Compare id. (citing litigators claiming “[i]n Westchester, stingy civil jurors ‘think it’s 
coming from their pocketbooks’”), with Sam Roberts, On Bronx Juries, Minority Groups 
Find Their Peers, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1988, at B1 (comparing Bronx, Manhattan, and 
Westchester juries and quoting litigators as saying “[j]urors in the Bronx tend to be 
working people that have had to strive all their lives and when they see that someone else 
has been a victim of wrongdoing they tend to compensate them fully”). 
171. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444, 1447 (2010) 
(mapping “geography of patent disputes”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade 
Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 111, 112–13 (2008) (“Many 
seem to blame the [Eastern District of Texas] for the wrongs of the patent litigation 
system.”); Jonathan D. Glater, To the Trenches: The Tort War Is Raging On, N.Y. Times, 
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well before a Bronx jury that wouldn’t work for one in Manhattan. 
But jury pool information is not equivalent to seeing the actual 
jurors’ reactions to the evidence and arguments.172 A closer approx-
imation, for parties who can afford them, is provided by jury consultants 
who put together “mock juries” and “focus groups.” These are familiar 
tools,173 allowing lawyers to try out their evidence and arguments on a 
practice audience drawn from the actual jury population.174 Mock juries 
help litigators precisely by giving them—and their clients—a preview of 
how the audience will respond to the evidence and narrative presented 
in a case.175 Advertising materials for jury consultants even suggest that 
they can be useful for calculating the range of damages, potentially help-
ing to bring a case to settlement.176  
Because such tools favor well-heeled and more sophisticated parties 
over weaker ones, the policy question arises of how to manage this im-
balance. One possible class of interventions is public provision, and one 
such existing device is the “summary jury trial,” greater use of which is 
currently being promoted by judges and the bar.177 
                                                                                                                 
June 22, 2008, at B1 (citing “counties, like Madison County in Illinois, that were perceived 
as hostile to corporate defendants”). 
172 . See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of 
previewing jury’s reactions and consequent informational loss). 
173. See Tricia McDermott, The Jury Consultants, CBS News (Dec. 5, 2007, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18559_162-620794.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“In the brave new world of high-stakes, high-profile trial preparation, the people 
running the show are not the lawyers, but rather jury consultants. . . . These days, it’s hard 
to find a big case without experts in human behavior involved.”). 
174. See, e.g., Robert L. Haig & Steven P. Caley, Deep-Pocket Perils: Defendants Rich 
in Resources Must Act to Overcome Bias, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1994, at 59, 59 (“Videotaping the 
mock jury trial and deliberations will help reveal what jurors really think about the 
defendant and its case. This may be a sobering yet enlightening experience that can be 
put to good effect . . . in considering settlement possibilities.”). 
175. Of course, the expense of jury consultants could also eat away at the settlement 
surplus and lower the chances of settlement. There is a debate as to the efficacy of jury 
consultants in improving clients’ prospects and bringing about settlement. See Jury 
Selection, Am. Judicature Soc’y, http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_whoserves_selection.asp 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (summarizing debate 
over utility of “trial consultants”). 
176. See, e.g., Mock Trial Jury Research, Tsongas Litig. Counseling, http://tsongas. 
com/services/mock-trial/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 19, 
2013) (claiming mock jury trial “[p]rovides damage calculations and estimates . . . to assess 
settlement value”); see also Jury Consulting, DOAR Litig. Counseling, 
http://doar.com/trial-consulting/jury-consulting/index.asp (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (asserting damages research using mock juries 
“may even help [litigators] advocate for an alternative solution to a trial”).  
177. See U.S. Dist. Court for the Middle Dist. of Pa., Civil Jury Trial Bench/Bar Task 
Force Final Report 30 (2008) [hereinafter Civil Jury Trial Report], available at 
http://www.judgeyvettekane.net/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/Civil_Jury_Trial_Task_ 
Force_Report.96132437.pdf (recommending “expanding use of summary-jury trials in 
appropriate cases” given “[j]udicial officers who have presided over summary-jury trials 
have had positive experience with cases settling afterwards”). 
1372 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1323 
  
a. Summary Jury Trials. — In a sort of mock jury organized by the 
court itself, jurors are drawn from the actual jury pool and seated for an 
abbreviated trial.178 This jury’s “verdict” is advisory and nonbinding;179 it 
has no consequence beyond informing the parties of the likely outcome 
should the case actually go to trial. This device, endorsed in the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,180 has as its 
main purpose the promotion of settlement by using a lifelike preview.181 
Regarding settlement discussions following the rendering of the sum-
mary jury trial verdict, one commentator has noted that “[w]ith the 
parties present and a preview of the case fresh in their minds, even the 
most unyielding litigants tend to settle.”182 As judges and practitioners 
recognize, the value of (approximately) previewing the jury in this way 
includes the “client education” effect: Having clients witness the 
audience reaction may well increase the likelihood of settlement.183 
Summary jury trials appear to be rarely used, however;184 no doubt 
                                                                                                                 
178. Civil Litigation Management Manual, supra note 32, at 81 (describing summary 
jury trial as “abbreviated hearing in which counsel present summary evidence to a 
jury . . . selected from the court’s regular jury pool” and “presided over by a district or 
magistrate judge”).  
179. See Molly McDonough, Summary Time Blues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2004, at 18, 18 (“A 
jury from the court’s pool renders an advisory, nonbinding verdict.”). 
180. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendments (“[T]he judge 
and attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures such as mini-trials, 
summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that can 
lead to consensual resolution of the dispute without a full trial on the merits.”). 
181. Civil Jury Trial Report, supra note 177, at 15 n.20 (“In a summary jury trial, . . . 
the lawyers offer a truncated version of their cases and the jury deliberates to a non-
binding verdict. The goal is to allow counsel and parties to see how a jury reacts to the case 
with the idea that such insight will facilitate settlement discussions.”).  
182. McDonough, supra note 179, at 18; see also id. at 18–19 (discussing views of trial 
lawyer who “praises [summary jury trials’] effectiveness in rapidly settling cases” and 
recounting experience of New York state judge for whom only six cases out of 170 ordered 
to summary jury trial in five-year period eventually went to actual trial); Larry Ray, 
Emerging Options in Dispute Resolution, A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 66, 68 (“The [summary 
jury trial’s] advisory verdict helps the parties build a mutually acceptable settlement.”). 
183. See McDonough, supra note 179, at 19 (relating judge’s experience that “[w]ith 
the principals present, . . . settlement is most likely if they’ve had a chance personally to 
witness the strengths and weaknesses of their positions and after they see a value attached 
to their exposure”). 
184. See Civil Litigation Management Manual, supra note 32, at 82 n.8 (“In statistical 
year 2009, five cases, all in a single district, were referred to summary jury and summary 
bench trials out of the 28,078 cases referred to ADR in the fifty-one districts reporting 
their referrals to ADR. No cases were referred to mini-trials.”); McDonough, supra note 
179, at 18 (“[D]espite a scattering of believers, few judges avail themselves of [summary 
jury trials].”). This low use seems not to have changed much over time. See Elizabeth 
Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, ADR and Settlement in the Federal District Courts 5 (1996) 
(noting “[j]ust over half the courts report authorization or use of the summary jury trial” 
but “[t]he level of usage reported by most courts is . . . very low—generally around one or 
two cases a year”). For a critical view of summary jury trials, see generally Richard A. 
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the expense of running such a simulation is an obstacle. Parties may also 
be concerned about revealing their trial strategies through such a 
thorough rehearsal.185 Another problem noted by practitioners appears 
to be that rehearsing arguments before such a mock jury might actually 
increase the parties’ sense of uncertainty about a jury outcome, once they 
see how badly their evidence or arguments can be misunderstood by the 
lay jurors.186  
Such approximations are not the only way, however, to affect how 
the parties think about their future jury. Less direct measures can also 
exert some influence. The following policy choices have been driven 
mainly by other rationales, but their potential to temper or amplify 
audience-driven preview effects should also be taken into account. 
b. Designing the Jury Pool. — Imagine trying to predict the reactions of 
a jury to be drawn from the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area. Now 
imagine one drawn only from Beverly Hills. Uncertainty about the future 
jurors and the predictability of their reactions to the future trial materials 
depend on how diverse the feeder population is. Broadening or 
narrowing the geographic and demographic range of a given jury pop-
ulation may thus be a useful policy lever for managing preview effects of 
both theoretical flavors—convergence under the standard story and 
divergence under the behavioral story.187 
c. Forum and Venue Rules. — The choice of forum or venue can be 
used by the parties to select a more predictable jury pool, whether to take 
advantage of predictably favorable tendencies or just to reduce risk. Civil 
procedure already regulates these choices, of course; the point here is to 
emphasize a further regulatory concern, which is how such choices inter-
act with previews and thereby influence settlements. One important 
caveat is in order, however: The theories are ambiguous about the effect 
tightening forum or venue options has on settlement choices. Under the 
convergence story, having a more predictable finder of fact should 
promote settlement. But under the divergence theory, a perception of 
control over who sits on the jury might feed the self-serving bias of the 
                                                                                                                 
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366 (1986). 
185. See McDonough, supra note 179, at 18 (“[L]awyers who have criticized the 
process say they don’t feel comfortable laying their cards on the table during what could, 
if settlement goals fail, amount to a dry run before a real trial with real consequences.”). 
186. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 135, at 19. To elaborate, lawyers and 
clients can find watching mock jury deliberations terrifying because they learn “how 
completely their evidence has been misunderstood, how confused the jurors are as to both 
the facts and the law, . . . how lightly jurors reach decisions on matters of . . . importance, 
how freely they ignore the court’s instructions and . . . how willing they are to spend other 
people’s money.” Id. 
187. A similar logic might apply to specialized juries, in contexts where they may be 
used. 
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litigants (here, the side choosing the forum), leading to less settlement. 
The question of the net effect in any given context is an empirical one. 
d. Voir Dire. — What sorts of questions should the lawyers be allowed 
to ask during jury selection? What questions should the judge ask? How 
much leeway should the parties have in rejecting potential jurors? All of 
these policy design choices can affect the litigators’ estimates (even well 
before jury selection begins) about who their future jury will be. Yet 
there is again a second effect: In theory, greater perceived control may 
worsen self-serving bias, even as it reduces uncertainty. If so, the settle-
ment effects could go either way. Under policies that increase the 
parties’ perceived (and perhaps true) control over the jury, the parties 
may expect this degree of control to narrow down the range of possible 
jurors, thereby making the outcome seem more predictable. But this 
sense of control might also fuel overoptimism on each side. This state of 
anticipating future control is a kind of “twilight zone,” one might say—
because it has not yet happened, it can “sharpen” both parties’ predic-
tions, but away from each other’s. How these competing effects play out 
is another empirical question. 
e. Jurors’ Own Questions. — Should jurors be allowed to submit ques-
tions for the judge to ask a witness? This approach, now being actively 
promoted as a policy reform, is already in use in civil cases in a number 
of jurisdictions, including Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, and Indiana.188 It 
has also been used in federal court, as well as in criminal cases—most 
famously, in the Roger Clemens trial.189  
This practice allows a “jury preview” in a very direct and obvious 
sense, although only after trial begins. As one judge notes, “‘Allowing 
jurors to submit written questions during the evidence phase of the trial 
gives the lawyers and the judge a window into the juror’s thinking.’”190 
Another judge describes it as having “‘a free shadow jury’”191—and better 
yet, “this shadow jury [consists of] your real jurors.”192 
2. Clarifying Uncertainty. — The first three procedural tools—
summary jury trials, jury pool design, and forum-shopping constraints—
operate before trial, potentially making jury reactions more predictable, 
even without adding direct knowledge about the actual future jurors. By 
contrast, the fourth and fifth means—voir dire and jurors’ questions—
occur at trial, potentially increasing knowledge about the actual jurors. 
                                                                                                                 
188. See Drummond, supra note 28, at 16 (noting “[s]everal states, such as Indiana, 
Colorado, and Arizona, have mandated that courts allow jury questions for all jury trials” 
and Illinois has done so for civil cases). 
189. See id (describing juror questions in Clemens trial). 
190. Id. (quoting Hon. James F. Holderman, Co-Chair, Special Comm. on Jury 
Innovation, ABA Section of Litig.). 
191. Id. (quoting Russell Hardin Jr., Member, Trial Att’y Advisory Bd., ABA Section 
of Litig.). 
192. Id.  
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Clearly, the first three can affect the parties’ predictions before trial (and 
before actual jury selection) begins. But what about the latter two poli-
cies, which only affect what the parties can learn during trial? These 
might seem of little importance for decisions made before trial.193  
That’s not necessarily so, as the choice to settle before trial can turn 
on how much the parties anticipate (before trial) that they will learn (dur-
ing trial) about the jurors and their reactions. For this reason, the design 
of voir dire, as well as the potential for jurors to suggest questions for the 
witnesses, can in theory affect the parties’ motivations for going to trial in 
the first place.  
To see why, it is helpful to digress briefly to consider two meanings 
of a litigant’s “jury uncertainty” and to make clear the distinction 
between them. The two differ in their consequences for the usefulness 
and the risks of previews. Speaking generically about jury uncertainty can 
obscure this contrast.  
The first meaning of “jury uncertainty” is that little can be known 
about the jury before trial, although learning about the jury may be possi-
ble once trial begins. (The parties may see how jurors are reacting to the 
witnesses, for instance. Or the questions the jurors are submitting to the 
judge may suggest they are leaning in favor of one side. Or the parties 
may learn about the jurors’ inclinations during voir dire.) This form of 
jury uncertainty can be reduced, but only during trial itself. 
The second meaning of “jury uncertainty” is that little or nothing 
can be discerned about the jury, even after trial has begun. Either there 
will be no clues revealed at trial or, equivalently, they will be unin-
formative. (For instance, the trial materials may not be the sort that elicit 
visible juror reactions beyond boredom. Or the jurors will not be allowed 
to submit questions. Or the parties cannot learn much about the jurors 
during voir dire because the lawyers will not be permitted to ask probing 
questions.)  
Being clear about these two distinct meanings yields a lesson for 
theory in the convergence story, and a lesson for policy in the divergence 
story. Consider first the convergence story, as articulated in Part I. Under 
the first meaning of jury uncertainty, settlement is delayed (or thwarted) 
because the parties perceive there to be a positive value to waiting. The 
parties in effect gamble that the future signals during trial will be more 
favorable than those attending the previews before trial.194 But consider 
                                                                                                                 
193. This is not to downplay their potential to affect settlement during trial, a 
possibility central to the theoretical analysis presented in Part I. 
194. An easy way to see this is to consider the other extreme in which there is no such 
jury uncertainty because what is learned from the preview is a perfect predictor of the trial 
information. This may be true, for instance, if the trial materials are absolutely clear in 
their meaning, and not dependent on the factfinder. In such a case, there is no value to 
waiting: The gamble of going to trial will not be worthwhile, because there is no chance of 
receiving different information at trial. 
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now the second meaning: If there will be no chance of learning anything 
new (and thus more favorable) at trial, then there is no gain to waiting.195 
In this scenario there is no possibility of any useful signals during trial, 
and thus no useful signals to be predicted based on the previews. In our 
first notion of jury uncertainty, then, the uncertainty actually creates the 
value in waiting. In our second notion of jury uncertainty, by contrast, 
the uncertainty limits the value of waiting.196 The value of delay for the 
parties, in anticipation of further learning, depends not on how much 
uncertainty exists, but rather on how much of it can still be cleared up.  
In the divergence story, the distinction has more practical stakes. 
Recall from Part I that one way previews can prevent settlement is by 
generating an expectations gap at a critical moment before trial, at the 
last real chance to settle.197 As we have seen, this can occur even if jury 
uncertainty will be eliminated during trial (the first meaning). But pre-
views can also prevent settlement if jury uncertainty persists during trial 
(the second meaning).198 In either scenario, previews can ruin a chance 
at settlement before trial. What differs is the likelihood that such a lost 
opportunity will really be the last chance to settle. This seems far more 
likely if the jury remains an unknown quantity at trial (permitting self-
serving bias) than if the jury becomes well known at trial (causing some 
convergence).199 
The policy upshot is that there is a greater reason to worry about the 
potential for previews to thwart settlement in those cases where little can 
                                                                                                                 
195. If there is a cost to starting the trial, as we have been assuming, the value of 
waiting is in fact negative. The parties may well be observed settling on the eve of trial 
rather than waiting—but they would not be doing so due to previews. 
196. Despite this distinction between these two stories of jury uncertainty, it is worth 
noting the analogous mechanisms in the t0 decision to wait for t1 (in the first story) and the 
t0 decision to go through with trial (in the second story). In each case, if there is no 
settlement at t0, it is because the parties are choosing to gamble on the future. The gamble 
is possible because no useful learning has yet narrowed down the likely range of 
possibilities. In the former case, this is because useful learning about the jury cannot occur 
before trial; in the latter, because it cannot happen at all.  
197. In terms of the notation introduced in Part I.C: If in the absence of previews, Pp 
J - (c1 + c2) < Pd J + (c1 + c2), but Pp
*J - c2 > Pd*J + c2, then the parties would settle before trial 
but not during trial—even though there is some common learning and thus some 
convergence during trial. But if previews inject an expectations gap due to self-serving bias 
such that (PJ + x) J - (c1 + c2) > (PJ - x) J + (c1 + c2), then they will ruin the chance at early 
settling. 
198. If in the absence of previews, Pp J - (c1 + c2) < Pd J + (c1 + c2), but (PJ + x) J - c2 > (PJ - 
x) J + c2, then the parties would settle before trial but not during trial (due in part to the 
self-serving bias gap created when information is revealed during trial). But if previews 
shift forward the creation of this divergence gap, such that (PJ + x) J - (c1 + c2) > (PJ - x) J + (c1 
+ c2), then they will ruin the chance at early settling.  
199. The implicit assumption is that (PJ + x) J - c2 > (PJ - x) J + c2 is more likely than Pp*J 
- c2 > Pd*J + c2. This seems highly plausible, as it supposes that the parties’ expectations at 
trial are farther apart in the self-serving bias case than in the partial learning (partially 
converged) case. 
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be learned about the jury and its reactions, even at trial. And this circles 
back to the design of the rules for voir dire and for jurors’ questions, 
which affect precisely these key variables: what litigants expect they can 
learn about the jurors, and hence how much uncertainty will remain after 
trial begins. 
CONCLUSION 
The play was a great success, but the audience was a failure.200  
 
In litigation, as in any theater, the script matters and so does the 
audience—but what really counts is how they interact. Just as this is true 
at trial, so it is for settlement before trial. Parties settle not in the shadow 
of the evidence and arguments, but in the shadow of what the factfinder 
will think of those materials. The value to the parties of previewing the 
script, then, depends on whether they can also preview the audience.  
Beginning with that basic idea, this Essay reconsiders the two leading 
theories of settlement. Playing them out in light of a stylized difference 
between trials by judge and trials by jury, the analyses of preview effects 
introduced here imply that each theory should predict an “asymmetric 
vanishing” of trials. A preliminary look at the data from the policy experi-
ment created by the staggered adoption of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(a)(3) suggests that litigant choices responded in ways con-
sistent with the proposed asymmetry—resulting in an accelerated decline 
in bench trials relative to jury trials.  
Whether these observations are seen as encouraging or troubling 
depends, of course, on one’s normative priors about the comparative 
merits of settlements, jury trials, and bench trials. But theory also 
matters: As this Essay emphasizes, the potentially competing and some-
times subtle mechanisms by which preview policies may be affecting liti-
gant choices should be considered alongside the data, informing norma-
tive assessments and the design of policy responses.  
As this exploratory Essay is aimed at starting a conversation, direc-
tions for further research are worth noting. Factors such as uncertainty 
and risk aversion, the time shifting of litigation costs,201 principal-agent 
                                                                                                                 
200. This favorite nugget is often attributed to Oscar Wilde, but may in fact have 
originated with George Bernard Shaw. See George Bernard Shaw, Review: Visiting the 
Halls, World, Oct. 19, 1892, reprinted in 2 Bernard Shaw: The Diaries, 1885–1897, at 861 
(Stanley Weintraub ed., 1986) (“You were a perfect success: the audience was a dismal 
failure.”). For an analysis of the attribution, see The Play Was a Great Success, but the 
Audience Was a Total Failure, Quote Investigator (May 19, 2011), 
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/05/19/play-success/ (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (explaining quote could be from Oscar Wilde, William Collier, Daniel Frohman, 
or George Bernard Shaw). 
201. One might ask, for instance, whether the shifting of trial costs to pretrial is more 
significant in previews for bench trials or for jury trials. 
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concerns,202 and the potential for strategic behavior may be brought into 
extensions of the theoretical starting points offered here. Empirical work 
should also find encouragement in this initial foray: Observational 
studies might focus on variation in judge rotation, judge announcement, 
juror questions, and other existing policies noted above; 203  finer 
breakdowns among types of litigants or cases might be possible in other 
samples, such as in state courts;204 and experimental studies might target 
the jury-bench distinction. Not least, future work should address both the 
theory and empirics of preview effects at the other major “checkpoints” 
of civil procedure.205 
Procedural values beyond those touched upon here are also surely 
worth considering; for instance, think of the participatory or expressive 
values of having one’s “day in court.” And the normative concerns raised 
in this Essay point naturally to further questions of procedural design: 
Should parties be allowed to opt out of preview policies, either during 
litigation or through ex ante contracting?206 Should the pervasiveness of 
previews today affect how much control parties have in choosing a jury or 
bench trial?207 Should it inform how much power a judge is given in 
influencing the jury, in overruling it,208 or in letting a case get to one in 
the first place? 
                                                                                                                 
202. How lawyer-client misalignment interacts with overoptimism about the strength 
of one’s case may be an especially rich area for study; consider for example the “client 
education” effect noted above. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
203. This is not to exclude other practices that one might imagine to affect the force 
of previews, such as the choice of jury size or the use of specialized judges or juries. 
204. Moreover, variation in state court practices may offer useful comparisons for 
researchers and may suggest other forms of preview policies worth studying. See supra 
notes 153–157 and accompanying text (discussing varying judge rotation systems among 
states).  
205. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (discussing “checkpoints” such as 
motions to dismiss, preliminary injunctions, class certification, Markman and Daubert 
hearings, and summary judgment). Relatedly, future work might investigate the potential 
for preview effects in other settings, such as in criminal justice, ADR, agencies, 
international or foreign tribunals, or arbitration.  
206. Parties might also contract around the bench-jury option, such as through jury 
trial waivers. More generally, one might ask whether, when, and how easily parties should 
be allowed to switch adjudicators—not only between judge and jury, but also among 
judicial officers (including magistrate judges or special masters).  
207. The civil jury trial guarantee in the Seventh Amendment is a constraint, but 
there are many ways in which the tools of civil procedure can (and already do) affect the 
extent of the real usage of the jury trial. One mundane example is the short time limit for 
demanding a jury before the right to a jury is waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 (specifying 
party must demand jury trial “no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the 
issue is served”). A more controversial example is summary judgment. See, e.g., Suja A. 
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 Va. L. Rev. 139, 142–45 (2007) 
(arguing summary judgment violates Seventh Amendment because it subverts jury’s 
factfinding role). 
208. How appellate review might alter preview effects is an analogous question: Just 
as a trial judge’s propensity to overrule the jury—such as through remittitur or judgment 
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APPENDIX 
Chart 1 lists the districts forming the treated and comparison groups 
in the policy experiment created by staggered adoption of Rule 26(a)(3). 
The selection of these districts is explained in Part II.B.3. Table 1 shows 
summary statistics for these groups in the period before the studied pol-
icy shock, that is, before the late-adopting districts were forced to catch 
up to the early adopters. The population of cases for all present analyses 
consists of the contracts, property, and torts cases described in Part II.B. 
Table 2 quantifies extensions of the basic comparisons shown in 
Figures 1 through 4, using the estimates of β1 from this elementary 
difference-in-differences regression in OLS:  
yit = β1 · treated · post + β2 · treated + Xt · B3 + εit 
where y is the ratio of bench to jury trials, i indexes group of districts, Xt 
consists of fixed effects for year, and post indicates being in the post-
treatment period. The resulting estimates suggest a drop in the ratio 
indicative of asymmetric policy impact, consistent with the figures. 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows these estimates, assuming that the 
post-period begins in 2001. This corresponds to the line drawn in the 
graphs. But recall that the policy break is somewhat blurred because the 
rule gave judges the discretion to apply the new rule to cases that had 
already begun but not yet finished as of December 2000. To account for 
this possibility, I present an alternative set of estimates in Column (2) of 
Table 2. For these alternative estimates, the post-period begins one year 
earlier.   
Table 3 reports estimates separately for trial rates in jury cases and in 
bench cases, using the same OLS framework. The dependent variable is 
the share of cases that reached a jury verdict or a bench verdict. For these 
trial rates, the denominator is the population of filed cases, excluding 
those coded as nonfinal dispositions (such as bankruptcy stays, transfers 
and remands to other tribunals, or statistical closure), appeals of magis-
trate judge rulings, and cases in which the defendant did not even 
appear. The unit of presentation is percentage points. The interpretation 
of these estimates is discussed in Part II.C.3. 
                                                                                                                 
notwithstanding the verdict—might amplify the effect of a “judicial preview,” would the 
same be true of lightened scrutiny on appeal? 
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CHART 1 — TREATMENT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 
 
 Treated Comparison 
California groups   
   Cleanest match CDCA NDCA 
   All California  CDCA, EDCA NDCA, SDCA 
   California-Oregon CDCA, EDCA NDCA, OR 
New England groups   
   First Circuit only ME, RI MA, NH 
   All New England 
 
ME, RI, NDNY MA, NH, CT, VT 
 
TABLE 1 — MEAN NUMBER OF BENCH TRIALS AND JURY TRIALS, 1996–2000 
 
       Bench         Jury   Bench/Jury 
   T   C   T      C    T    C 
California groups       
   Cleanest match 11.2 
[5.0] 
  6.5 
[4.0] 
14.4 
[4.1] 
    8.5 
  [4.1] 
  .79 
[.37] 
  .83 
[.50] 
   All California  13.0 
[5.6] 
  8.9 
[4.9] 
18.3 
[6.8] 
  10.9 
  [5.8] 
  .75 
[.36] 
  .91 
[.47] 
   California-Oregon 13.0 
[5.6] 
10.5 
[4.7] 
18.3 
[6.8] 
  18.1 
  [6.4] 
  .75 
[.36] 
  .61 
[.28] 
New England groups       
   First Circuit only   5.5 
[4.0] 
  5.5 
[4.4] 
12.1 
[6.7] 
  20.8 
[11.6] 
  .43 
[.31] 
  .26 
[.20] 
   All New England 
 
 
  7.1 
[4.6] 
10.6 
[7.3] 
18.2 
[9.2] 
  32.4 
[15.7] 
  .36 
[.22] 
  .31 
[.18] 
Notes: This table presents, under “Bench” and “Jury,” the mean number of cases 
reaching a bench verdict or a jury verdict, respectively, in each group of districts (as listed 
in Chart 1, supra). The final two columns show the corresponding ratios. T denotes 
treated group and C denotes comparison group. The case population consists of the con-
tracts, torts, and property cases described in Part II.B. Standard errors are in brackets. 
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TABLE 2 — THE EFFECT OF EVE-OF-TRIAL PREVIEWS ON THE NUMBER OF 
BENCH TRIALS RELATIVE TO JURY TRIALS 
 
   (1)   (2) 
California groups   
   Cleanest match   -.91 
 [.25] 
  -.60 
 [.32] 
   All California  -1.03 
 [.26] 
  -.80 
 [.36] 
   California-Oregon   -.79 
 [.22] 
  -.71 
 [.25] 
New England groups   
   First Circuit only   -.20 
 [.13] 
  -.28 
 [.10] 
   All New England   -.15 
 [.07] 
 
  -.15 
 [.07] 
Notes: This table presents coefficients on the treated x post interaction in a difference-
in-differences regression. The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of cases 
reaching a bench verdict to the number of cases reaching a jury verdict, in the districts 
forming the treatment or control group. In Column (1), post begins in the year 2001. In 
Column (2), post begins in the year 2000. The case population consists of the contracts, 
torts, and property cases described in Part II.B. The estimates are OLS. Time-fixed effects 
are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. N = 2 pooled groups · 10 years = 20. 
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TABLE 3 — THE EFFECT OF EVE-OF-TRIAL PREVIEWS  
ON BENCH AND JURY TRIAL RATES 
 
   Bench Trials       Jury Trials 
California groups   
   Cleanest match   -.76 
 [.38] 
    .28 
  [.41] 
   All California    -.61 
 [.33] 
    .54 
  [.43] 
   California-Oregon   -.56 
 [.33] 
    .68 
  [.37] 
New England groups   
   First Circuit only -1.06 
 [.47] 
    .22 
[1.19] 
   All New England 
 
 
  -.81 
 [.18] 
   -.45 
  [.76] 
Notes: This table presents coefficients on the treated x post interaction in a difference-
in-differences regression. The dependent variable is the percentage (in percentage points) 
of cases that reach a bench verdict (in the left column) or a jury verdict (in the right 
column), in the districts forming the treatment or control group. For each test, post begins 
in the year 2001. The case population consists of the contracts, torts, and property cases 
described in Part II.B. The estimates are OLS. Time-fixed effects are included. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets. N = 2 pooled groups · 10 years = 20. 
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